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Recent	  quantitative	  research	  has	  shown	  a	  sizable	  impact	  of	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  written	  observations	   on	   the	   preliminary	   rulings	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   European	   Union.	   In	  explaining	  the	  high	  success	  rate	  of	  the	  Commission,	  scholars	  have	  referred	  to	  an	  old	  assumption	  according	  to	  which	  the	  Court	  uses	  the	  Commission	  as	  a	  ‘political	  bellwether’	  to	  determine	  how	  far	  Member	  States	  may	  be	  pushed	  towards	  enhanced	  legal	  integration	  in	  any	  given	  case.	  The	  present	  study	  assesses	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  Commission	  acts	  according	  to	  such	  logic	  in	  these	  proceedings.	  Interviews	  with	  central	  actors	  in	  the	  Commission	  reveal	  internal	  processes	  and	  considerations	  made	  when	  determining	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  in	  three	  ‘most	  likely’	  cases.	  	  Rather	  than	  a	  political	  bellwether,	  the	  empirical	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  Commission	  is	  better	  characterized	  as	  an	  activist	  that	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  line	  with	  its	  own	  policy	  preferences	  or	  legal	  analysis	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  such	  preferences	  are	  politically	  acceptable	   to	   Member	   States.	   Scholars	   seeking	   to	   understand	   the	   Commission’s	   success	   rate	  under	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure	   should	   thus	   consider	   alternative	   explanations	   to	   the	  Commission’s	   success.	   In	   this	   regard,	   theories	   stressing	   the	  Commission’s	  expertise,	   resources	  and	  judicial	  strategy	  of	  being	  a	  ‘repeat	  player’	  appear	  to	  be	  particularly	  relevant.	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 1.	  Introduction	  	  1.1.	  Problem	  description	  Recent	  quantitative	  research	  on	  the	  preliminary	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  shown	  a	  sizable	  impact	  of	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  position	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  judgements	  of	  the	  Court.1	  Scholars	  find	  the	  high	  success	  rate	  of	  the	  Commission	  puzzling	  as	  their	  statistical	   models	   control	   for	   the	   position	   of	   the	   Advocate-­‐General,	   who	   investigates	   and	  evaluates	  the	  legal	  issues	  in	  the	  case	  and	  presents	  an	  independent	  opinion	  before	  the	  Court.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  impact	  holds	  although	  one	  controls	  for	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Advocate-­‐General,	   seen	   as	   a	   ‘proxy	   for	   the	   legal	   merits’2,	   make	   these	   scholars	   conclude	   that	   the	  Commission	   has	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   Court’s	   rulings	   that	   cannot	  merely	   be	   explained	   by	   similar	  interpretations	  of	  the	  legal	  question	  at	  stake.	  As	   an	   alternative	   explanation	   to	   this	   puzzling	   finding,	   scholars	   have	   referred	   to	   an	   old	  assumption	   according	   to	   which	   the	   Court,	   in	   striving	   to	   advance	   legal	   integration,	   uses	   the	  Commission	  as	  a	  ‘political	  bellwether’3	  to	  determine	  how	  far	  the	  governments	  of	  Member	  States	  may	  be	  pushed	  towards	   legal	   integration	   in	  a	  given	  case.	  According	   to	  Burley	  &	  Mattli	   (1993),	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  is	  thus	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  how	  far	  Member	  States	  can	  be	  pushed	  towards	  the	  Commission’s	  vision	  of	  maximum	  integration	  without	  risking	  that	  they	  react	  
                                                      1	  Carrubba,	  Clifford	  J.,	  Matthew,	  Gabel	  &	  Charles,	  Hankla.	  (2008).	  ‘Judicial	  Behavior	  Under	  Political	  Constraints:	  Evidence	  from	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice’,	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  102(4):	  435-­‐52,	  and	  (2012)	  ‘Understanding	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  European	  Integration’,	  American	  Political	  Science	  
Review	  106(01):	  214–23,	  Stone	  Sweet,	  Alec.	  (2010),	  ‘The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Judicialization	  of	  EU	  Governance’,	  Living	  Reviews	  in	  EU	  Governance.	  5(2):	  1-­‐50.	  2	  Carrubba,	  Gable	  &	  Hankla	  (2012:221)	  3	  The	  term	  ‘bellwether’	  is	  commonly	  used	  to	  describe	  something	  that	  is	  used	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  what	  will	  happen	  in	  the	  future	  (Oxford	  Advanced	  American	  Dictionary).	  In	  politics,	  the	  term	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  geographical	  region	  where	  political	  tendencies	  are	  likely	  to	  match	  those	  in	  a	  wider	  area,	  e.g.	  the	  result	  of	  the	  election	  in	  that	  region	  is	  likely	  to	  predict	  the	  result	  in	  the	  latter.	  One	  classic	  example	  is	  the	  American	  state	  Missouri,	  which	  produced	  the	  same	  outcome	  as	  the	  national	  results	  in	  the	  presidential	  elections	  96.2%	  of	  the	  time	  for	  the	  century	  between	  1904	  and	  2004,	  only	  missing	  1956.	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with	  legislative	  override4	  and/or	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  ruling;	  actions	  that	  would	  go	  against	  the	  Court’s	  objective	  of	  ensuring	  a	  uniform	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  put	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Court	  at	  risk:	  
Court	   watchers	   have	   long	   understood	   that	   the	   ECJ	   uses	   the	   EC	   Commission	   as	   a	   political	  bellwether.	   In	   any	   given	   case,	   the	   ECJ	   looks	   to	   the	   Commission's	   position	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	  political	  acceptability	  to	  the	  member	  states	  of	  a	  particular	  result	  or	  a	  line	  of	  reasoning.5	  
Implicitly,	  Burley	  &	  Mattli’s	  argumentation	  suggests	  that	  an	  assessment	  of	  political	  acceptability	  among	  Member	  States	  determines	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Commission.	  Interestingly,	  up	  to	  today	  no	  one	  has	  presented	  empirical	  data	  to	  support	  this	  assumption.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  not	  even	  known	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  Commission	  even	  considers	  Member	  States’	  preferences	  in	  these	  proceedings.	  As	  the	  Commission	  is	  the	  only	  EU	  institution	  having	  the	  right	  to	  initiate	  new	  EU	  law6	  and	  in	  view	  of	  the	  high	  hurdles	  that	  any	  legislative	  action	  in	  the	  EU	  needs	  to	  overcome	  (due	  to	  consensus	  or	  supra-­‐majoritarian	  decision	  rules,	  multiple	  veto	  players	  and	  heterogeneous	  preferences	  within	  the	   relevant	   treaty-­‐	   and	   law-­‐making	   institutions),	   one	   may	   question	   if	   the	   Commission	   is	  concerned	  about	  Member	  States’	  preferences.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations	  and	  the	  very	  absence	  of	  empirical	  data,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  Commission	   uses	   the	   opportunity	   to	   submit	   a	   written	   observation	   to	   the	   Court	   under	   the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure	  comes	  across	  as	  an	  issue	  that	  merits	  empirical	  investigation.	  In	   agreement	   with	   Marshall	   &	   Rossman’s	   criteria	   for	   qualitative	   research	   (2011),	   such	   an	  enquiry	   is	   not	   only	   relevant	   for	   the	   intra-­‐academic	   community	   but	   also	  motivated	   by	   a	  more	  general	  need	  to	  enhance	  our	  understanding	  of	  these	  processes.7	  As	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  Court	  
                                                      4	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  definition	  used	  by	  Carrubba,	  Gable	  &	  Hankla	  (2012),	  an	  override	  is	  here	  defined	  as	  occurring	  when	  a	  court’s	  ruling	  is	  modified	  in	  subsequent	  legislation	  or	  treaty	  revisions.	  5	  Burley,	  Anne-­‐Marie,	  &	  Walter,	  Mattli.	  (1993:71).	  ‘Europe	  Before	  the	  Court:	  A	  Political	  Theory	  of	  Legal	  Integration’,	  International	  Organization	  47(1)	  6	  In	  almost	  all	  cases	  of	  secondary	  legislation	  the	  Commission	  has	  a	  monopoly	  for	  proposing	  a	  new	  law.	  In	  some	  aspects	  of	  justice	  and	  interior	  affairs,	  the	  Commission	  shares	  this	  right	  with	  one	  quarter	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  (Article	  61	  I	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon).	  7	  Compare	  with	  Marshall,	  Catherine	  &	  Rossman,	  Gretchen	  B.	  (2011:91).	  ‘Designing	  Qualitative	  Research’	  (5th	  ed.),	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have	  authoritative	  effect	   in	  all	  Member	  States	  and	  as	  history	  shows	  that	  the	  rulings	  often	  have	  significant	  policy	  implications,	  ultimately	  it	  regards	  issues	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  1.2.	  Aim	  and	  questions	  for	  research	  The	   aim	   of	   the	   present	   study	   is	   to	   assess	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   political	   bellwether	   assumption,	  thereby	   enhancing	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   Court	  under	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure.	  At	   first	   sight,	   it	   may	   seem	   logical	   to	   focus	   such	   an	   inquiry	   on	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   interaction	  between	   the	   two	   institutions:	   the	   written	   observations	   that	   the	   Commission	   submits	   to	   the	  Court.	  To	  do	  so	  is	  however	  easier	  said	  than	  done;	  its	  written	  observations	  are	  not	  published.	  Scholars	   have	   however	   managed	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   systematic	   collections	   of	   Reports	   for	   the	  Hearing:	  documents	  that	  reveal	  statements	  made	  in	  the	  written	  observations	  that	  are	  referred	  to	  during	   the	   oral	   hearing	   in	   a	   given	   case.8	   Scholars	   at	   the	   Centre	   for	   European	  Research	   at	   the	  University	   of	  Gothenburg	   (CERGU)	   recently	   created	   a	   data	   collection	  of	   such	   reports	   covering	  1562	  cases	  during	  the	  time	  period	  1997-­‐2008.9	  Yet,	  even	  if	  one	  would	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  written	  observations	  submitted	  by	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  Commission	  in	  a	  given	  case	  and	  identify	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  positions	  therein,	  such	  a	  correlation	   would	   only	   encompass	   the	   positions	   of	   Member	   States	   that	   submitted	   a	   written	  observation	  in	  a	  given	  case.	  Such	  an	  analysis	  would	  thus	  not	  reveal	  the	  preferences	  and	  possible	  influence	  of	  Member	  States	  that	  did	  not	  submit	  a	  written	  observation.	  In	  addition,	  an	  analysis	  of	  such	   documents	   would	   not	   allow	   drawing	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   former	   (Member	   States’	  preferences)	  determined	  the	  latter	  (the	  position	  of	  the	  Commission).	  Arguably,	  Member	  States’	  
                                                                                                                                                     Sage,	  Los	  Angeles	  8	  Carrubba,	  Gabel	  &	  Hankla	  (2008)	  9	  Naurin,	  Daniel,	  Cramér,	  Per,	  Lyons,	  Sara,	  Moberg,	  Andreas	  &	  Östlund,	  Allison.	  (2013).	  ‘Coding	  observations	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  judgments	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  EU	  under	  the	  preliminary	  reference	  procedure	  1997-­‐2008:	  Data	  report’	  CERGU’s	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  2013:1	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preferences	  may	  only	  influence	  the	  Commission	  if	  the	  Commission	  is	  aware	  of	  such	  preferences	  and	  considers	  them	  at	  the	  point	  in	  time	  when	  its	  written	  observation	  is	  determined.	  Consequently,	  it	  makes	  more	  sense	  to	  focus	  the	  limited	  resources	  at	  hand	  for	  the	  present	  study	  on	   investigating	   the	   process	   of	   determining	   the	   Commission’s	   position	   and	   the	   practical	  experience	  of	   civil	   servants	   at	   the	  Commission.	   Stein	   (1981)	   interestingly	  noted	   that	   although	  preliminary	  rulings	  often	  have	  significant	  policy	  implications,	  the	  political	  decision-­‐makers	  view	  these	  processes	  as	  “technical”	  and	  lawyers	  are	  thus	  ‘given	  a	  more	  or	  less	  free	  hand	  to	  speak	  for	  the	  Commission,	  the	  Council	  and	  national	  governments’.10	  To	   validate	   the	   political	   bellwether	   assumption,	   this	   study	   thus	   argues	   that	   there	   should	   be	  awareness	  for	  the	  threat	  of	  legislative	  override	  and/or	  non-­‐compliance	  in	  the	  Commission	  that	  plays	  a	  determinant	  role	  in	  the	  process	  of	  determining	  its	  positions.	  If	  such	  awareness	  cannot	  be	  detected	  one	  may	  question	  the	  assumption,	  as	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  why	  the	  Court	  would	  interpret	  the	   Commission’s	   position	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   political	   acceptability	   if	   that	   is	   not	   an	   adequate	  description	  of	   the	  Commission’s	   interaction.	   In	   terms	  of	   theoretical	   implications,	   such	   findings	  would	  imply	  that	  the	  strands	  of	  neofunctional	  scholars	  advocating	  this	  assumption	  would	  have	  to	  revisit	  their	  arguments.	  A	  suitable	  way	  to	  assess	  whether	  or	  not	  this	   is	  the	  case	   is	  to	  consider	   internal	  procedures	  and	  the	   experience	   of	   civil	   servants	   involved	   in	   these	   processes.11	   A	   threat	   of	   legislative	   override	  and/or	   non-­‐compliance	   among	  Member	   States	   that	   is	   not	   recognized	   by	   central	   actors	   in	   the	  Commission	  is	  arguably	  not	  a	  threat	  that	  would	  feed	  the	  Commission’s	  position.	  	  In	  line	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  present	  study,	  the	  questions	  for	  research	  are	  thus	  as	  follows:	  What	  does	  the	  experience	  of	  central	  actors	  in	  the	  Commission	  reveal:	  
                                                      10	  Stein,	  Eric.	  (1981:3).	  ‘Lawyers,	  Judges,	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  a	  Transnational	  Constitution.’	  American	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Law	  75(1):	  1–27	  11	  To	  make	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  test	  of	  the	  argument,	  it	  would	  make	  sense	  to	  also	  investigate	  the	  experience	  and	  perceptions	  of	  the	  judges	  at	  the	  Court.	  Given	  limited	  resources,	  that	  is	  unfortunately	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  study.	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a) Meaning:	   Are	  written	   observations	   best	   characterized	   as	   contributions	   to	   a	   process	   of	  developing	  EU	  law	  or	  as	  indicators	  of	  political	  acceptability	  among	  Member	  States?	  b) Process:	   Is	   the	  process	  of	  determining	   the	  Commission’s	  position	  best	   characterized	  as	  one	  driven	  mainly	  by	  legal	  or	  political	  considerations?	  The	   following	   chapter	   lays	   the	   foundations	   for	   the	   empirical	   investigation	   that	   will	   follow	   to	  answer	   these	   questions.	   More	   specifically,	   the	   following	   chapter	   defines	   relevant	   concepts,	  situates	   the	   study	   in	   the	   research	   field	   in	   the	   area	   of	   European	   studies	   and	   explains	   the	  relevance	  of	  the	  questions	  for	  research.	  	  	  	  2.	  Theoretical	  framework	  
 2.1.	  The	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure	  and	  the	  development	  of	  European	  integration	  The	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure12	  was	  established	  with	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome.	  In	  the	  Court’s	  own	  words,	  the	  procedure	  is	  a	  fundamental	  mechanism	  of	  EU	  law	  aimed	  at	  enabling	  the	  courts	  and	  tribunals	   of	   the	   Member	   Stats	   to	   ensure	   uniform	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   that	   law	  within	  the	  EU.13	  Under	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure,	  the	  Court	  replies	  to	  questions	  from	  national	  courts	  or	  tribunals	   in	   the	   Member	   States	   on	   how	   to	   interpret	   EU	   law.	   The	   Court	   does	   not	   adjudicate	  between	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  case	  but	  guides	  the	  national	  court	  or	  tribunal	  on	  how	  to	  understand	  EU	  law.	  In	  concrete	  terms,	  the	  question	  is	  often	  one	  about	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  between	  EU	  law	  and	  national	  law	  or	  practice.	  Due	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  over	  national	  law,	  
                                                      12	  Article	  267	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (TFEU).	  The	  full	  text	  of	  the	  Article	  is	  displayed	  in	  Annex	  2	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  13	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union:	  Recommendations	  to	  national	  courts	  and	  tribunals	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  initiation	  of	  preliminary	  ruling	  proceedings	  (2012/C	  338/01)	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the	   judgments	   of	   the	   Court	   often	   imply	   deciding	   on	   whether	   or	   not	   to	   restrict	   national	  autonomy.	   In	   interpreting	  EU	   law,	   the	  Court	  may	  end	  up	  creating	  new	   legal	   rules	   that	  did	  not	  exist	  before.	  Additionally	  and	  as	  Craig	  and	  Búrca	  (2011)	  note,	  in	  practice	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  are	   often	   so	   closely	   addressed	   to	   the	   case	   at	   hand	   that	   the	   referring	   court	   will	   have	   little	  discretion.14	  	  The	  Court’s	  findings	  bind	  not	  only	  the	  referring	  court	  but	  also	  all	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  This	  is	  why,	  by	  virtue	  of	  Article	  23	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  all	  Member	  States,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  main	  proceedings,	  Member	  States	  and,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  other	  actors,15	  are	  entitled	  to	  submit	  written	  and/or	  oral	  observations	  to	  the	  Court	  concerning	   issues	  raised	  by	  a	  reference	  for	  a	  preliminary	  ruling.16	  There	   is	   wide	   academic	   agreement	   that	   the	   Court	   has	   played	   a	   fundamental	   role	   in	   the	  development	  of	  European	   integration	  by	  establishing	  a	  supranational	   legal	  order	   in	  the	  EU	  via	  the	  preliminary	   ruling	  procedure.	  Among	   the	  most	   famous	  doctrines	   established	  by	   the	  Court	  through	   this	   procedure	   are	   the	   principles	   of	  direct	   effect	   and	   supremacy	   that	   transformed	   the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure	  into	  one	  that	  allows	  individuals	  to	  challenge	  national	  law	  with	  the	  help	  of	  EU	  law.	  In	  fact,	  the	  principle	  of	  direct	  effect	  implies	  that	  individuals	  can	  invoke	  EU	  law	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  legal	  claims	  in	  national	  courts.	  The	  principle	  of	  supremacy	  implies	  that	  if	  national	  law	  and	  EU	  law	  are	  incompatible,	  EU	  law	  trumps	  national	  law.	  Interestingly,	   scholars	   disagree	   on	   how	   to	   understand	   this	   development	   and	   the	   two	   grand	  theories	   of	   European	   integration,	   neofunctionalism	   and	   intergovernmentalism,	   offer	   different	  explanations	  to	  this	  end.	  According	  to	  the	  neofunctional	  perspective,	  launched	  by	  Haas	  in	  1958,	  the	  development	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  supranational	  actors	  such	  as	   the	   Court	   and	   the	   Commission.17	   Prominent	   European	   integration	   scholars	   such	   as	  Weiler	  
                                                      14	  Craig,	  Paul	  &	  de	  Búrca,	  Graínne.	  (2011:474).	  ‘EU	  Law.	  Text,	  Cases,	  and	  Materials’,	  Oxford,	  New	  York,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  (5th	  ed.)	  15	  Article	  23,	  Protocol	  no	  3,	  Statute	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (C	  83/210)	  16	  Lenaerts,	  Koen.	  (2010).	  ‘The	  Contribution	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  to	  the	  Area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Justice’,	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly,	  59(2):	  255-­‐301	  17	  Sandholtz,	  Wayne,	  &	  Stone-­‐Sweet,	  Alec.	  (1998).	  ‘European	  integration	  and	  supranational	  governance’,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	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(1999)	   have	   attributed	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   EU	   from	   an	   international	   legal	   order	   into	   a	  more	   constitutional	   one	   to	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Court.18	   According	   to	   the	   intergovernmentalist	  perspective	  (Garrett	  1992,	  Garrett	  &	  Weingast	  1993)	  this	  development	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  process	  where	  Member	  States	  influence	  and	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  manoeuvre	  of	  the	  Court.19	  With	  respect	   to	   legal	   integration,	   the	  main	  divide	  between	  the	  two	  perspectives	   is	   the	   issue	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Court	  acted	  independent	  of	  Member	  States,	  more	  specifically	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Member	  States	  influence	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  through	  threats	  of	  override	  and	  non-­‐compliance.	  In	  addressing	  this	  issue,	  scholars	  from	  both	  sides	  have	  had	  to	  consider	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  produced	  a	  number	  of	  controversial	  rulings	  that	  pushed	  for	  legal	  integration	  despite	  opposition	  from	  Member	  States.20	  Arguably,	  the	  practical	  relevance	  of	  these	  perspectives	  is	  best	  determined	  by	  empirical	  analysis.	  Similar	   to	   the	   neofunctional	   perspective,	   the	   challenge	   of	   explaining	   the	   development	   of	  European	   legal	   integration	   has	   also	   been	   addressed	   from	   a	   separation	   of	   powers	   approach,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  Court	   is	  seen	  as	  engaging	   in	   judicial	  politics.21	  According	  to	  this	  model,	  the	  checks	   that	  Member	  States	  posit	  on	   the	  Court	  constitute	   the	   limits	  of	   the	  Court’s	  ability	   to	  engage	  in	  such	  judicial	  politics.	  The	   ultimate	   threat	  Member	   States	   can	   pose	   to	   a	   Court	   that	   ‘goes	   too	   fast’	   in	   enhancing	   legal	  integration	  (practising	  Court	  activism)	  is	  to	  review	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Court,	  in	  Pollack’s	  word	  a	  ‘nuclear’	   option22	   that	   so	   far	   has	   not	   been	   used.	   As	   this	   would	   require	   treaty	   change	   (hence,	  
                                                      18	  Weiler,	  Joseph.	  (1999).	  ‘The	  Constitution	  of	  Europe:	  Do	  the	  New	  Clothes	  have	  an	  Emperor?	  and	  other	  Essays	  on	  European	  Integration’	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press;	  Burley	  and	  Mattli	  (1993)	  19	  Garrett,	  Geoffrey	  R.	  1992.	  ‘International	  Cooperation	  and	  Institutional	  Choice:	  The	  European	  Community’s	  Internal	  Market’,	  International	  Organization	  46(2):	  533–60,	  Garrett,	  Geoffrey,	  and	  Weingast,	  Barry	  R.	  1993.	  ‘Ideas,	  Interests,	  and	  Institutions:	  Constructing	  the	  European	  Community’s	  Internal	  Market’,	  in	  Goldstein,	  Judith,	  and	  Keohane,	  Robert	  O.	  (eds)	  Ideas	  and	  foreign	  policy:	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  20	  Stein	  (1981),	  Weiler	  (1999),	  Burley	  &	  Mattli	  (1993)	  21	  Naurin	  &	  Larsson	  (2013)	  22	  Pollack,	  Mark.	  (1997:118-­‐119).	  ‘Delegation,	  Agency,	  and	  Agenda-­‐Setting	  in	  the	  European	  Community’,	  
International	  Organization,	  51(1),	  99-­‐134.	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unanimous	   agreement	   among	  Member	   States),	   the	   threat	   is	   commonly	   not	   interpreted	   as	   an	  efficient	   one.23	   Member	   States	   may	   however	   resort	   to	   other,	   less	   complicated	   ‘methods	   of	  revenge’	  by	  adopting	  more	  detailed	  and	  precise	   law	   to	   regain	  national	   sovereignty	  on	  a	   given	  issue.24	  A	   fundamental	   premise	   of	   the	   separation	   of	   powers	   model	   is	   that	   the	   Court	   is	   aware	   of	   the	  preferences	  of	  key	  actors	  in	  the	  legislative	  process,	  thereby	  succeeding	  in	  avoiding	  rulings	  that	  would	   lead	   to	   legislative	   override	   or	   non-­‐compliance.	   In	   reality,	   doing	   so	   comes	   across	   as	   an	  information	  challenge	  as	  the	  Court,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  an	  informed	  decision,	  would	  need	  to	  know	  the	  preferences	  not	  only	  of	  the	  Commission	  but	  also	  of	  at	   least	  a	  qualified	  majority	  of	  Member	  States.	   And	   as	   only	   cases	   with	   a	   high	   political	   salience	   trigger	   a	   large	   number	   of	   written	  observations	  from	  Member	  States,	  where	  would	  the	  Court	  get	  such	  information?	  	  2.2.	  The	  political	  bellwether	  assumption	  In	   1993,	   Burley	  &	  Mattli	   argued	   that	   the	   Court	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	   preferences	   of	  Member	  States,	  yet	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  Court	  attempts	  to	  track	  their	  preferences.25	  In	  relation	  to	   this,	   Burley	   &	   Mattli	   launched	   the	   idea	   of	   characterizing	   the	   Commission	   as	   a	   political	  bellwether,	   arguing	   that	   in	   any	   case,	   the	   Court	   	   looks	   at	   the	   Commission’s	   position	   as	   an	  indicator	  of	  political	  acceptability	  among	  Member	  States.26	  In	  a	  similar	  spirit,	  Helfer	  &	  Slaughter	  (1997)	  have	  argued	  that	   the	  boundaries	  of	   the	  Court	  are	  set	  by	  the	  political	   institutions	  of	   the	  Community,	  first	  and	  foremost	  by	  Member	  States:	  
If	   the	   Court	   pushes	   teleological	   interpretation	   of	   the	   treaty	   -­‐	   a	   mode	   of	   interpretation	   biased	  toward	  achieving	  the	  ever	  closer	  union	  described	  in	  the	  Treaty's	  preamble	  -­‐	  too	  far	  too	  fast,	  the	  member	   states	   can	   act	   to	   curtail	   its	   jurisdiction	   or	   urge	   their	   national	   courts	   to	   disregard	   its	  judgments.	  They	  might	  also	  seek	   to	  shift	   the	  composition	  of	   the	  Court…(…).	  The	  Court	  has	   thus	  
                                                      23	  Pollack	  (1997:121),	  Alter	  (2009),	  Stone	  Sweet	  (2010:9-­‐11)	  24	  Stone	  Sweet	  (2010:14)	  25	  Burley	  &	  Mattli	  (1993:51)	  26	  Burley	  &	  Mattli	  (1993:71)	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used	   the	   Commission	   of	   the	   Community,	   the	   executive	   political	   branch	   of	   the	   Community,	   as	   a	  political	  bellwether,	  watching	  its	  position	  on	  major	  cases	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  what	  the	  political	  traffic	  will	  bear.27	  
Implicitly,	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  suggests	  that	  the	  Commission	  acts	  according	  to	  this	  logic,	  as	  it	  is	  difficult	   to	   see	  why	   the	   Court	   otherwise	  would	   use	   the	   Commission	   as	   a	   political	   bellwether.	  Interestingly,	  neither	  Burley	  &	  Mattli	  nor	  Helfer	  &	  Slaughter	  provide	  empirical	  data	  to	  support	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  Commission	  acts	  according	  to	  this	  logic.	  It	   is	  visible	  to	  anyone	  witnessing	  the	  oral	  hearings	  at	  the	  Court	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  sometimes	  clearly	  go	  against	  that	  of	  those	  Member	  States	  intervening.	  Consequently,	  it	  may	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  advocates	  of	  the	  political	  bellwether	  assumption	  do	  not	  see	  the	  Commission’s	  position	   as	   politically	   acceptable	   only	   to	   the	   specific	  Member	   States	   that	   intervene	   in	   a	   given	  case	  but	  to	  all	  Member	  States	  or	  at	  least	  to	  a	  qualitative	  majority	  of	  these.	  Both	  Burley	  &	  Mattli	  and	  Helfer	  &	  Slaughter	  refer	  to	  Stein’s	  study,	  which	  indeed	  demonstrates	  that	  out	  of	  11	  landmark	  cases,	  the	  Court	  only	  diverged	  from	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  in	  two	  cases.	  Interestingly,	  Stein	  does	  not	  explicitly	  argue	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  is	  determined	  by	  political	   acceptability	   among	  Member	   States	  but	  merely	  hypothesizes	   that	   the	  Commission	  was	  motivated	  by	  considerations	  with	  a	  national	  flavour:	  
…	  the	  Commission’s	   lawyers…	  (…)	  may	  have	  been	  motivated	  as	  much	  by	  national	  constitutional	  practices	  as	  by	  their	  political	  judgments	  against	  pressing	  the	  legal	  integration	  process	  too	  far.	  The	  spurt	  of	  criticism	  following	  the	  ruling	  in	  the	  Defrenne	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  justification	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  sensitivity.28	  	  It	  thus	  seems	  as	  if	  it	  has	  simply	  been	  assumed	  that	  the	  Commission	  would	  act	  according	  to	  this	  logic.	   Interestingly,	   several	   scholars	   have	   picked	   up	   this	   line	   of	   reasoning.	   In	   her	   PhD	  dissertation,	   Kilroy	   (1999)	   argues	   that	   the	   Commission	   is	   sensitive	   to	   the	   preferences	   of	  Member	  States	  and	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  effect	  on	  the	  Court’s	  decisions	  is	  partly	  attributable	  to	  
                                                      27	  Helfer	  &	  Slaughter	  (1997:315)	  28	  Stein	  (1981:26)	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the	  effect	  of	  Member	  States	  on	  the	  Commission.29	  Even	   more	   recently,	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   Court	   would	   use	   the	   Commission	   as	   a	   political	  bellwether	   has	   gained	   new	   interest	   as	   intergovernmentalist	   scholars	   have	   engaged	   in	  quantitative	  research	  on	   the	  relationship	  between	  written	  observations	  submitted	  by	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  Court’s	  rulings.	  Carrubba,	  Gabel	  and	  Hankla	  (2008)	  analysed	  Member	  States’	  and	  the	  Commission’s	  written	  observations	  during	  three	  years	  (1989,	  1993,	  1997)	  and	  detected	  an	  aggregate	   impact	  not	  only	  of	  Member	  States’	  preferences	  but	  also	  of	   the	  Commission’s	  written	  observations	  on	  the	  Court’s	  rulings.30	  Carrubba,	  Gabel	  &	  Hankla	  (2008,	  2012)	  have	  had	  to	  defend	  their	   findings	   in	  a	   fierce	  exchange	  with	   the	   neofunctional	   scholars	   Stone,	   Sweet	   &	   Brunell	   (2012,	   2013)	   who	   reject	   their	  conclusions	  and	  argue	  that	  the	  Commission	  and	  neofunctional	  theory	  dominate	  as	  predictors	  of	  Court	  rulings.31	  While	  they	  disagree	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  Member	  States’	  written	  observations	  on	  the	  Court’s	  ruling,	  they	   interestingly	   share	   the	   assessment	   that	   there	   is	   a	   sizable	   and	   puzzling	   impact	   of	   the	  Commission	  on	  the	  Court.32	  This	  aspect	  has	  also	  been	  confirmed	  in	  a	  recent	  preliminary	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  collection	  of	  preliminary	  rulings	  put	  together	  by	  scholars	  at	  the	  Centre	  for	  European	  Research	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Gothenburg,	  which	  demonstrates	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  the	  rulings	  and	  the	  signals	  that	  the	  Court	  receives	  from	  Member	  States.33	  Partly	  in	  line	  with	  Stone,	  Sweet	   &	   Brunell,	   Larsson	   &	   Naurin	   (2013)	   find	   that	   the	   Commission’s	   ‘voice’	   tends	   to	   weigh	  heavier	   than	   that	   of	   the	  Member	   States.	   In	   light	   of	   these	   findings,	   the	   enquiry	   of	   the	   present	  study	  comes	  across	  as	  both	  relevant	  and	  timely.	  As	   alternative	   explanations,	   scholars	   have	   stressed	   common	   visions	   among	   the	   judges	   at	   the	  
                                                      29	   Kilroy,	   Bernadette	   Anne.	   (1999:14).	   ‘Integration	   Through	   Law:	   ECJ	   and	   Governments	   in	   the	   EU’,	   Ph.D.	  dissertation,	  UCLA.	  Kilroy’s	  analysis	   is	  based	  on	  293	  randomly	  selected	  cases	  in	  the	  area	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  good	  and	  social	  policy	  from	  1958-­‐1994.	  30	  Carrubba,	  Gabel	  &	  Hankla	  (2008)	  31	  Stone	  Sweet	  &	  Brunell	  (2012:212,	  2013)	  32	  Stone	  Sweet	  (2004),	  Carrubba,	  Gable	  &	  Hankla	  (2008)	  33	  Naurin	  &	  Larsson	  (2013)	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Court	   and	   referred	   to	   a	   process	   of	   socialisation	   in	   the	   early	   years	   of	   European	   integration,	  including	  the	  establishment	  of	   ‘Euro-­‐law’	  associations	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  that	  promoted	  a	  unified	   view	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   European	   cooperation.34	   As	   Hofmann	   notes,	   while	   probably	  bearing	  relevance	  in	  explaining	  the	  early	  years	  of	  European	  integration,	  it	  is	  not	  certain	  whether	  those	  factors	  are	  still	  relevant	  in	  understanding	  the	  Court’s	  behaviour	  today.35	  Alternatively,	  scholars	  have	  proposed	  that	   the	  Commission’s	   impact	  on	  Court	  rulings	   is	  simply	  due	  to	  a	  congruity	  of	  preferences	  (for	  more	  integration)	  between	  the	  two	  institutions	  or	  that	  it	  is	  a	   result	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   judicial	   strategy	   of	   being	   “the	   prototypical	   repeat	   player	   on	   the	  European	  legal	  stage”36.	  	  Carrubba,	  Gabel	  and	  Hankla	  (2012)	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Court’s	  rulings	  simply	  reflects	  the	  legal	  merits	  on	  the	  specific	  legal	  question	  at	   stake.	   In	   their	   view,	   the	  political	   bellwether	   assumption	   could	   be	   a	   relevant	   explanation	   as	  well	  as	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  Court	  (simply)	  agrees	  with	  or	  is	  responsive	  to	  a	  Commission	  pro-­‐integrationist	  agenda,	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  find	  out	  more:	  
Given	   the	   sizable	   impact	   of	   commission	   observations	   on	   rulings,	   identifying	   the	   appropriate	  interpretation	  is	  important	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  ECJ	  decision	  making.37	  
It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  study	  to	  assess	  all	  explanations	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  success	  under	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure.	   Yet	   and	   importantly,	   if	   the	   political	   bellwether	  assumption	  cannot	  be	  validated,	  this	  implies	  an	  elimination	  of	  one	  competing	  explanation.	  To	   sum	   up,	   it	   seems	   that	   it	   has	   simply	   been	   assumed	   that	   the	   Commission	   acts	   as	   a	   political	  bellwether	   in	   front	   of	   the	   Court	   and	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   lack	   of	   empirical	   data	   to	   support	   this	  argument.	   Against	   this	   background,	   it	   appears	   relevant	   to	   conduct	   an	   empirical	   enquiry	   to	  determine	   whether	   the	   political	   bellwether	   logic	   is	   indeed	   one	   that	   characterizes	   the	  
                                                      34	  Alter	  (2009:66)	  35	  Compare	  with	  Hofmann,	  Andreas.	  (2013).	  ‘Strategies	  of	  the	  Repeat	  Player.	  The	  European	  Commission	  between	  
Courtroom	  and	  Legislature’,	  PhD	  thesis,	  Universität	  zu	  Köln	  36	  Hofmann	  (2012:9)	  37	  Carrubba,	  Gable	  &	  Hankla	  (2012:222)	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Commission’s	   interaction	   with	   the	   Court.	   If	   not	   the	   case,	   both	   intergovernmental	   and	  neofunctional	   scholars	   might	   have	   to	   revisit	   their	   arguments	   and	   direct	   their	   efforts	   on	  assessing	  alternative	  explanations	  to	  understand	  the	  Commission’s	  high	  success	  rate	  under	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure.	  	  Such	  findings	  would	  however	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Court	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  threats	  of	   legislative	   override	   and/or	   non-­‐compliance	   among	  Member	   States,	   as	   suggested	   by	   recent	  quantitative	  research.38	  It	  could	  simply	  be	  that	  the	  Court	  considers	  Member	  States’	  preferences	  directly	   (as	   expressed	   during	   the	   proceedings)	   without	   using	   the	   Commission	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	  political	  acceptability.	  To	  some	  extent,	  such	  findings	  would	  strengthen	  the	  intergovernmentalist	  perspective	  as	  it	  proposes	  that	  the	  Court	  is	  even	  more	  sensitive	  to	  Member	  States’	  preferences	  than	  the	  neofunctional	  scholars	  advocating	  the	  political	  bellwether	  assumption	  have	  assumed.	  
	  2.3.	  The	  argument	  for	  considering	  the	  experience	  of	  central	  actors	  in	  the	  European	  Commission	  As	  outlined	   in	   the	   introductory	  chapter,	   to	  demonstrate	   the	  validity	  of	   the	  political	  bellwether	  assumption,	   there	   should	   be	   awareness	   for	   the	   threat	   of	   legislative	   override	   and/or	   non-­‐compliance	   in	   the	  Commission	   that	  plays	  a	  determinant	   role	   in	   the	  process	  of	  determining	   its	  positions	  under	   the	  preliminary	   ruling	  procedure.	  A	   threat	  of	   legislative	  override	  and/or	  non-­‐compliance	  among	  Member	  States	  that	  is	  not	  recognized	  by	  central	  actors	  in	  the	  Commission	  is	  arguably	  not	  a	  threat	  that	  would	  feed	  the	  Commission’s	  assessment.	  	  As	   also	   outlined	   in	   the	   introductory	   chapter,	   a	   premise	   of	   the	   present	   study	   is	   that	   a	   mere	  analysis	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  written	  observations	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  understand	  the	  dynamic	  of	  the	  Commission’s	   interaction	  with	   the	  Court.	  On	  the	  contrary,	   to	  understand	  whether	  Member	  States	   influence	   the	  Commission’s	  position	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  consider	   the	  experience	  of	  actors	  involved	  in	  these	  processes:	  the	  civil	  servants	  of	  the	  Commission.	  
                                                      38	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By	  investigating	  the	  process	  and	  purpose	  of	  written	  observations	  submitted	  by	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  Court,	  the	  present	  study	  responds	  to	  a	  call	  from	  scholars	  such	  as	  Conant	  (2007)	  to	  cross	  the	   so-­‐called	   disciplinary	   divide	   between	   legal	   scholars	   and	   social	   scientists	   dealing	  with	   the	  legal	  integration	  of	  the	  EU.39	  Even	  more	  recently,	  Hofmann	  (2013)	  has	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	   exploring	   the	   relationship	   of	   preliminary	   references	   as	   options	   for	   the	   Commission	   to	  influence	  policy-­‐making.40	  The	  present	   study	   addresses	   the	   lack	  of	   empirical	   research	   to	   support	   assumptions	   regarding	  the	  Commission’s	   interaction	  with	   the	  Court	  under	   the	  preliminary	   ruling	  procedure.	  Notably,	  previous	  research	  has	  failed	  to	  consider	  internal	  processes	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  actors	  involved	  in	  determining	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Commission.	  Consequently,	  the	  present	  study	  has	  a	  potential	  of	  contributing	  to	  the	  on-­‐going	  academic	  debate	  on	  how	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure	   in	  European	   integration:	  a	  key	   issue	   in	   the	   field	  of	  European	  Studies.41	  In	  addition,	  while	  previous	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  early	  years	  of	  European	  legal	  integration	  and	   on	   landmark	   constitutional	   preliminary	   rulings,	   the	   present	   study	   allows	   exploring	  what	  these	  dynamics	  are	  like	  in	  a	  more	  recent	  context.	  The	   lack	   of	   such	   empirical	   research	   is	   however	   not	   surprising,	   given	   the	   lack	   of	   public	  information	   on	   the	   internal	   processes	   of	   the	   Commission.	   On	   its	   homepage,	   the	   Legal	   Service	  only	  provides	  a	  very	  general	  description	  of	  its	  mission,	  casting	  itself	  as	  an	  expert	  lending	  its	  legal	  expertise	  to	  the	  Court:	  
Representing	  the	  Commission	  as	  guardian	  of	  the	  Treaties,	  the	  Legal	  Service	  routinely	  intervenes	  as	  amicus	  curiae	  (friend	  of	  the	  court	  –	  similar	  to	  an	  expert	  witness	  giving	  a	  court	  the	  benefit	  of	  his	  advice)	  in	  preliminary	  ruling	  cases.42	  
                                                      .39	  Compare	  with	  Conant	  (2007:46)	  40	  Hofmann	  (2013:246)	  41	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  latest	  arguments	  put	  forward	  in	  this	  debate,	  see	  Carrubba,	  Gable	  &	  Hankla	  (2012)	  and	  Stone	  (2010).	  42	  Homepage	  of	  the	  Legal	  Service	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/agent_en.htm	  (accessed	  on	  8	  May	  2014)	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Hence,	  the	  information	  available	  to	  the	  public	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  grasping	  the	  dynamics	  of	  these	  processes.	  Previous	  academic	  literature	  on	  this	  topic	  only	  amounts	  to	  anecdotal	  elements	  that	  address	  the	  issue	  at	  a	  very	  general	  level.	  An	  interview	  with	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Legal	  Service	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	   allowed	  Hofmann	   to	   conclude	   that	   that	   the	   competent	   Directorate-­‐General	   takes	  the	  lead	  and	  that	  the	  Legal	  Service	  acts	  at	  gatekeeper	  when	  the	  written	  observation	  (here	  below	  called	  opinion)	  is	  determined:	  
This	  opinion	   is	  usually	  drafted	  at	  a	   low	   level	  by	   the	   responsible	  official	  assigned	   to	   the	  case,	   in	  some	   cases	   in	   consultation	   with	   the	   respective	   Head	   of	   Unit.	   The	   political	   level	   within	   the	  Commission	  (Cabinets	  and	  Commissioners)	  is	  not	  formally	  involved	  in	  this	  process.	  The	  opinion	  is	  returned	  to	  the	  Legal	  Service,	  who	  exclusively	  handles	  all	  interaction	  with	  the	  Court.	  While	  this	  process	   mostly	   involves	   little	   friction,	   it	   is	   the	   Legal	   Service	   who	   has	   the	   final	   say	   on	   legal	  interpretations,	   being	   able	   to	   override	   DG	   opinions.	   This	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   in	   politically	  sensitive	   cases,	   bearing	   in	  mind	   that	   the	   Legal	   Service	   is	   formally	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	  Commission	  president.43	  
From	  this,	  one	  may	  deduct	  that	  political	  considerations	  could	  feed	  the	  Commission’s	  assessment	  at	  a	  very	  early	  stage	  as	  the	  policy	  Directorate-­‐General	  makes	  the	  first	  draft.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  College	  of	  Commissioners	  is	  not	  formally	  involved	  in	  this	  process,	  meaning	  that	  there	  is	  no	  (automatic)	   political	   steering	   that	  way.	  What	   is	   lacking	   from	   the	   above	   account,	   yet	   crucial	   to	  determine	   the	   relevance	   of	   the	   political	   bellwether	   assumption,	   is	   information	   about	  circumstances	   that	  are	   taken	   into	  account	  by	   those	   involved	   in	   these	  processes.	   In	  addition,	   it	  would	   be	   relevant	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   actors	   involved	   in	   determining	   the	   Commission’s	  position	  see	  their	  role	  and	  the	  objective	  with	  the	  written	  observations.	  	  	  
                                                      43	  Hofmann	  (2013:78)	  
 19 
3.	  Methodological	  approach	  
 3.1.	  A	  case	  study	  In	   addition	   to	   shedding	   light	   on	   the	   general	   meaning	   and	   process	   of	   determining	   the	  Commission’s	   observations	   to	   the	   Court	   under	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure,	   it	   was	  deemed	  relevant	  to	  also	  assess	  considerations	  made	  in	  specific	  cases.	  Consequently	   and	   given	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   topic,	   the	   need	   to	   understand	   the	   purpose	   and	  meaning	   of	   internal	   processes	   and	   the	   limited	   resources	   at	   hand,	   a	   case	   study	   approach	  was	  deemed	  appropriate.	  In	  Yin’s	  words	  (2009)	  the	  case	  study	  approach	  allows	  illuminating	  complex	  phenomena	  in	  a	  real-­‐time	  context	  within	  the	  limited	  scope	  in	  terms	  of	  resources	  that	  a	  study	  of	  this	   dimension	   offers,	   and	   allows	  making	   an	   in-­‐depth	   investigation	   of	   relationships	   on	  which	  there	  is	  limited	  knowledge.44	  	  In	  policy-­‐areas	  where	  enhanced	  legal	  integration	  at	  EU	  level	  is	  relatively	  uncontroversial,	  there	  is	   not	   really	   a	   reason	   to	   assume	   that	   the	   Commission	   would	   act	   as	   a	   political	   bellwether.	  Accordingly,	  it	  made	  sense	  to	  invest	  the	  limited	  resources	  at	  hand	  on	  determining	  whether	  the	  argument	  holds	  in	  cases	  that	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  favourable,	  here	  understood	  as	  cases	  where	  
the	   issue(s)	   that	   the	   Court	   was	   asked	   to	   address	   had	   potential	   integrative	   effects	   (i.e.	   implied	  constraining	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   Member	   States)	   and	   where	   Member	   States	   opposed	   such	  
effects	   (logic:	   the	   stronger	   the	   opposition	   from	   the	   Member	   States,	   the	   higher	   the	   risk	   for	  legislative	   override	   and/or	   non-­‐compliance	   and	   thus	   the	   higher	   the	   incentive	   for	   the	  Commission	  to	  act	  as	  a	  political	  bellwether).	  	  Arguably,	  if	  the	  hypothesis	  cannot	  be	  validated	  in	  such	  cases,	  it	  is	  not	  likely	  that	  it	  would	  be	  validated	  in	  other	  (less	  favourable)	  cases	  either.	  As	  the	  present	  study	  seeks	  to	  trace	  internal	  processes	  (on	  which	  there	  is	  little	  public	  information	  available)	  and	  considerations	  that	  do	  not	  necessarily	  exist	  in	  a	  written	  format	  there	  was	  a	  need	  for	  oral	  information	  from	  the	  actors	  involved	  in	  these	  processes.	  In	  view	  of	  this	  it	  was	  deemed	  
                                                      44	  Compare	  with	  Yin	  (2009:17)	  
 20 
necessary	  to	  study	  cases	  that	  were	  fairly	  recent,	  to	  enhance	  the	  chance	  of	  reaching	  actors	  who	  can	  inform	  about	  such	  processes	  and	  considerations.	  	  One	   policy-­‐area	  where	   to	   look	   for	   suitable	   cases	   is	  migration	   and	   asylum	  policy.	   The	   right	   to	  determine	  who	  enters	  one’s	  national	  territory	  is	  close	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  national	  sovereignty	  and	  legal	  migration	  continues	   to	  be	  an	  area	  of	  mixed	  competence	  where	  Member	  States	  retain	   the	  right	   to	   determine	   volumes	   of	   admission	   of	   third-­‐country	   nationals	   to	   their	   territory	   to	   seek	  work.45	   Among	   migration	   and	   asylum	   scholars,	   this	   has	   traditionally	   been	   referred	   to	   as	   a	  restrictive	   policy	   area	  with	  Member	   States	   engaging	   in	   cooperation	   at	   EU	   level	   to	   control	   the	  numbers	  of	  migrants	  and	  asylum	  seekers.	  Scholars	  have	  explained	  the	  increasing	  cooperation	  on	  these	  issues	  with	  Member	  States	  seeking	  to	  ‘venue-­‐shop’,	  that	  by	  moving	  these	  matters	  to	  the	  EU	  venue	  they	  can	  circumvent	  liberal	  pressures	  and	  obstacles	  faced	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.46	  	  The	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  in	  2009	  implied	  important	  changes	  to	  the	  institutional	  framework	  for	  cooperation	  on	  these	  issues,	  notably	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  Qualified	  Majority	  Voting.	  Acosta	  &	  Geddes	  (2013)	  describe	  how	  Member	  States	  are	  now	  encountering	  constraints	  linked	  to	  the	  preliminary	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  due	  to	  the	  strengthened	  role	  of	  the	  EU	  institutions	  in	  this	  area.47	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  anti-­‐immigrant	  sentiments	  and	  political	  parties	  in	  most	  Member	  States,	   cooperation	   at	   EU	   level	   has	   not	   become	   easier.	   The	   Court	   thus	   finds	   itself	   acting	   in	   a	  policy-­‐area	  that	  is	  highly	  sensitive	  for	  Member	  States.	  In	  sum,	  given	  the	  high	  political	  salience	  and	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  Member	  States	  to	  let	  go	  of	  their	  national	   competencies	   in	   controlling	   immigration	   and	   asylum	   flows,	   asylum	   and	   migration	  policy	  was	  deemed	  a	  suitable	  policy-­‐area	  to	  test	  the	  political	  bellwether	  assumption.	  It	  was	  also	  a	   favourable	   policy-­‐area	   from	   a	   practical	   point	   of	   view	   as	   my	   familiarity	   with	   the	   relevant	  Directorate-­‐General	  gained	  through	  my	  own	  work	  experience	  at	  the	  Commission	  allowed	  me	  to	  
                                                      45	  Article	  79(5)	  TFEU	  46	  For	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  ‘venue-­‐shopping’	  theory,	  see	  Kaunert,	  Christian	  &	  Léonard,	  Sarah.	  (2012).	  ‘The	  development	  of	  the	  EU	  asylum	  policy:	  venue-­‐shopping	  in	  perspective’,	  
Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  19:9,	  1396-­‐1413	  47	  Acosta	  &	  Geddes	  (2013:191)	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identify	  relevant	  interviewees	  and	  convince	  them	  to	  share	  their	  experience:	  a	  key	  challenge	  for	  anyone	  engaging	  in	  carrying	  out	  elite	  interviews.	  Among	  the	  various	   legal	   instruments	   in	  this	  policy-­‐area,	   three	  were	  selected.48	  The	  rest	  of	   this	  chapter	   outlines	   why	   this	   is	   the	   case	   and	   describes	   the	   three	   preliminary	   rulings	   that	   were	  deemed	  suitable	  to	  test	  the	  political	  bellwether	  assumption.	  	  3.1.1	  Family	  Reunification	  The	  Family	  Reunification	  Directive49	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  2003	  and	  lays	  down	  minimum	  conditions	  under	  which	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  in	  a	  Member	  State	  are	  allowed	  to	  bring	  their	  family	  members	  over	  to	  that	  Member	  State.50	  During	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	   Directive,	   Member	   States	   were	   keen	   on	   not	   creating	   obligations	   to	   amend	   national	   law.	  Interestingly,	  some	  scholars	  even	  argue	  that	  the	  very	  reason	  why	  Member	  States	  such	  as	  France,	  Germany	   and	   the	   Netherlands	   agreed	   to	   the	   Directive	   was	   that	   they	   pursued	   and	   obtained	  maintenance	  of	  status	  quo.51	  As	  many	  other	  Directives	  in	  sensitive	  areas	  of	  cooperation	  such	  as	  migration	  policy,	  the	  final	  agreed	  product	  contained	  few	  binding	  articles	  that	  confined	  Member	  States	  only	  to	  a	  limited	  extent.52	  Family	  Reunification	  is	  a	  policy-­‐area	  that	  has	  been	  increasingly	  politicized	  in	  recent	  years	  with	  several	  Member	  States	  introducing	  restrictive	  policies.	  An	  important	  number	  of	  Member	  States	  including	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Denmark,	  Germany,	  France,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Sweden	  and	  the	  United	  
                                                      48	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  legal	  instruments	  in	  the	  area	  of	  immigration,	  see	  the	  homepage	  of	  DG	  Home	  Affairs.	  
49	  Council	  Directive	  2003/86/EC	  of	  22	  September	  2003	  on	  the	  right	  to	  family	  reunification	  OJ	  L	  251	  of	  3.10.2003	  50	  The	  United	  Kingdom,	  Ireland	  and	  Denmark	  did	  not	  opt	  in	  and	  are	  thus	  not	  bound	  by	  the	  Directive.	  51	  Block,	  Laura	  &	  Bonjour,	  Saskia.	  (2013:213).	  ‘Fortress	  Europe	  or	  Europe	  of	  Rights?	  The	  Europeanisation	  of	  Family	  Migration	  Policies	  in	  France,	  Germany	  and	  the	  Netherlands’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  Migration	  and	  Law	  15:	  203–224	  52	  Roos,	  Christof,	  &	  Zaun,	  Natascha.	  (2013:10).	  ‘Normative	  Regimes	  in	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Asylum	  and	  Immigration:	  International	  Conventions	  –	  Attitudes	  –	  EU	  Integration’.	  EUSA	  Paper.	  European	  Union	  Studies	  Association;	  Klaassen,	  Mark	  &	  Søndergaard,	  Johanne.	  2012:44.	  ‘How	  the	  Dutch	  response	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  Green	  Paper	  on	  Family	  Reunification	  compares	  to	  the	  reactions	  of	  other	  member	  states.	  The	  Netherlands	  as	  the	  black	  sheep	  of	  the	  family?’,	  A&MR	  2012	  Nr.	  08	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Kingdom	  have	  sharpened	  income	  and	  age	  requirements,	  reinforced	  controls	  on	  sham	  marriages	  or	  introduced	  integration	  conditions	  at	  entry	  for	  family	  migrants.53	  	  In	   its	   evaluation	   report	   adopted	   in	   October	   2008,	   the	   Commission	   argued	   that	   the	   low-­‐level	  binding	  character	  of	  the	  Directive	  had	  left	  Member	  States	  with	  (too)	  much	  discretion	  and	  that	  in	  some	  Member	   States	   the	   results	   had	   even	   been	   lowering	   the	   standards	   when	   applying	   ‘may’	  provisions	   of	   the	   Directive	   on	   certain	   requirements	   for	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	   right	   to	   family	  reunification	  in	  a	  too	  broad	  or	  excessive	  way.	  	  As	  of	  today,	  the	  Commission	  has	  not	  opened	  up	  for	  a	  recast	  of	  the	  Directive.	  The	  Commission	  did	  however	  recently	  publish	  guidelines	  in	  which	  it	  sets	  out	  its	  views	  on	  how	  the	  Directive	  should	  be	  interpreted.54	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   Commission	   has	   not	   opened	   up	   for	   a	   renegotiation	   of	   the	  Directive	   is	  commonly	  explained	  as	  a	   fear	  that	  a	  re-­‐negotiation	  would	  result	   in	  a	  restriction	  of	  the	   rights	   conferred	   in	   the	   Directive	   with	   Member	   States	   re-­‐gaining	   national	   sovereignty	   on	  these	  provisions.55	  	  In	  light	  of	  this	  information,	  which	  demonstrates	  the	  high	  political	  sensitivity	  during	  the	  adoption	  of	   the	   Directive	   and	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   as	   such,	   the	   Family	   Reunification	  Directive	   comes	  across	   as	   a	   piece	   of	   legislation	   that	   is	   under	   threat	   of	   legislative	   override	   and	   one	  where	   the	  political	  bellwether	  logic	  is	  well	  placed	  to	  fit	  in.	  Scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  predict	  which	  attitude	  the	  Court	  would	  adopt	  in	  this	  new	  and	  politically	  sensitive	  policy	  field.56	  Case	  C-­‐155/11	  PPU	  Mohammad	  Imran	  v	  Minister	  van	  Buitenlandse	  Zaken	  (hereinafter	  referred	  to	   as	   the	   Imran	   case)	   comes	   across	   as	   particularly	   suitable	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   present	  study.57	   In	   the	   Imran	   case,	   a	   national	   court	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   asked	   the	   Court	   whether	   a	  
                                                      53	  Block	  &	  Bonjour	  (2013:203)	  54	  COM(2014)	  210	  final	  55	  Roos	  &	  Zaun	  (2013:10)	  56	  Bonjour,	  Saskia	  &	  Vink,	  Maarten.	  (2013:401).	  ‘When	  Europeanization	  backfires:	  The	  normalization	  of	  European	  migration	  politics’,	  Acta	  Politica	  48:	  389–407	  57	  To	  date,	   there	   is	  only	  one	  other	  preliminary	  ruling	  regarding	  this	  case:	  Case	  C-­‐	  578/08	  Rhimou	  Chakroun	  v	  
Minister	  van	  Buitenlandse	  Zaken.	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Member	  State	  could	  refuse	  entry	  and	  residence	  to	  a	  family	  member	  on	  the	  sole	  ground	  that	  the	  family	   member	   has	   not	   passed	   a	   civil	   integration	   examination.	   Eventually,	   the	   Court	   never	  answered	   the	   question	   as	   the	   Dutch	   ministry	   in	   the	   meantime	   decided	   to	   grant	   a	   residence	  permit,	  only	  few	  days	  after	  the	  Commission	  had	  submitted	  its	  written	  observation	  on	  the	  case.58	  In	  accordance	  with	  established	  case	  law,	  the	  Court	  consequently	  deemed	  a	  ruling	  unnecessary.59	  	  Somer	   (2012)	   explains	   that	   following	   the	   judgment	   in	   a	   previous	   case	   regarding	   the	   same	  Directive,	  the	  Chakroun	  case,	  the	  Dutch	  government	  adopted	  a	  position	  paper	  in	  which	  it	  called	  for	  a	  tightening	  of	  EU	  migration	  legislation.60	  The	   Imran	   case	   is	   thus	   considered	   to	   be	   one	  where	  Member	   States	  were	   relatively	   united	   in	  opposing	  further	  legal	  integration	  (the	  number	  of	  Member	  States	  who	  submitted	  an	  observation	  to	   the	  Court	   is	  not	  known	  but	   the	  negotiations	  proceeding	   the	  Directive	  clearly	  show	  the	  high	  political	  sensitiveness	  of	  cooperation	  on	  this	  topic).	  	  The	  Imran	  case	  regarded	  the	  interpretation	  of	   the	   Family	   Reunification	  Directive	   in	   the	  Netherlands	   but	  would	   have	   had	   implications	   for	  recently	  introduced	  legislation	  also	  in	  Austria,	  Germany	  and	  France.61	  In	  addition,	  the	  Imran	  case	  took	  place	   in	  a	  context	  characterized	  by	  a	  changing	  national	  political	   landscape	   that	   sought	   to	  restrict	  rights	  conferred	  to	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  in	  the	  Directive:	  
The	  CJEU	  had	  three	  months	  to	  produce	  a	  ruling	  which	  would	  directly	  affect	  the	  legislations	  of	  four	  important	  Member	  States	  (Netherlands,	  Germany,	  Austria	  and	  France)	  which	  had,	  in	  the	  last	   few	   years,	   developed	   a	   clear	   strategy	   in	   their	   political	   and	   legislative	   discourse	   on	  limiting	  family	  reunification	  as	  a	  way	  of	  entrance	  for	  TCNs.	  In	  France,	  for	  example,	  President	  Sarkozy	   made	   a	   distinction	   between	   immigration	   that	   was	   ‘choisie’	   (chosen)	   such	   as	  highskilled	   workers,	   and	   not	   ‘subie’	   (endured)	   such	   as,	   in	   his	   view,	   family	   migration.	  
                                                      58	  Acosta	  Arcarazo,	  D.	  &	  Geddes,	  A.	  (2013:190).	  ‘The	  Development,	  Application	  and	  Implications	  of	  an	  EU	  Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  the	  Area	  of	  Migration	  Policy’,	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies,	  51:	  179–193.	  59	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Case	  C-­‐225/02	  García	  Blanco	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐523,	  paragraph	  28,	  quoted	  in	  Acosta	  &	  Geddes	  (2013)	  60	   Somer,	  Marie	   de.	   (2012:16).	   ‘Enhanced	   competences	   for	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Justice:	   “Re-­‐shuffling”	   the	  dynamics	  of	  EU	  migration	  policy-­‐making?’	  Migration	  Studies	  Unit	  Working	  Papers,	  No.	  2012/01	  61	  Bonjour	  (2010);	  Groenendijk,	  Koen.	  (2011).	  ‘Pre-­‐departure	  integration	  strategies	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  Integration	  or	  immigration	  policy?’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  Migration	  and	  Law	  13(1):	  1–30	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Integration	  measures	  were	  the	  final	  barrier	  (in	  a	  long	  list	  of	  obstacles	  including	  raising	  fees	  or	  increasing	  the	  spouses’	  age)	  in	  the	  campaign	  to	  limit	  family	  migration.62	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  Imran	  case	  was	  a	  PPU	  case	  (‘procédure	  préjudicielle	  d'urgence’),	  thus	  governed	  by	  an	  specific	  procedure	  	  according	  to	  which	  only	  the	  government	  of	  the	  Member	  State	  of	   the	  national	   court	   is	   allowed	   to	   lodge	   a	  written	   observation	   (and	  not,	   as	   under	   the	  normal	  preliminary	   ruling	   procedure,	   all	   Member	   States).	   However,	   in	   both	   procedures,	   all	   Member	  States	  have	   the	  opportunity	   to	  raise	   their	  voice	   in	   the	  oral	  hearing.	  Yet,	   the	   Imran	  case	  can	  be	  seen	  as	   a	   case	  where	   the	  Commission,	   if	   acting	   in	   line	  with	   the	  political	  bellwether	  argument,	  should	  have	  been	  particularly	  prone	  to	  act	  as	  a	  political	  bellwether,	  as	  the	  Court’s	   ‘information	  gap’	  is	  stronger	  than	  under	  the	  normal	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure.	  	  3.1.2	  Return	  The	  second	  legal	  instrument	  of	  interest	  is	  the	  Return	  Directive63	  (2008/115/EC),	  which	  sets	  out	  common	  EU	  rules	   for	   the	  return	  and	  removal,	   the	  use	  of	  coercive	  measures,	  detention	  and	  re-­‐entry	  of	  third-­‐country	  nationals.64	  The	  negotiations	  of	  the	  Directive	  proved	  difficult	  and	  Member	  States	   watered	   down	   several	   of	   the	   guarantees	   that	   the	   Commission’s	   initial	   proposal	   had	  included,	   a	   fact	   that	   reveals	   the	   high	   political	   salience	   of	   the	   Directive	   and	   the	   reluctance	   of	  Member	  States	  to	  let	  go	  of	  national	  sovereignty	  in	  in	  this	  policy-­‐area.	  Among	   the	   various	   preliminary	   rulings	   regarding	   the	   Return	   Directive,	   Case	   C-­‐61/11	   PPU	   El	  Dridi	  Hassen	  El	  Dridi	  alias	  Soufi	  Karim	  (hereinafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  El	  Dridi	  case)	  comes	  across	  as	  a	   ‘most	   likely’	  case,	  given	  the	  high	  political	  salience	  of	  the	  Directive	   in	  general	  and	  the	   legal	  provision	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  as	  such.	  	  	  
                                                      62	  Acosta	  &	  Geddes	  (2013)	  63	  Directive	  2008/115/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  16	  December	  2008	  on	  common	  standards	  and	  procedures	  in	  Member	  States	  for	  returning	  illegally	  staying	  third-­‐country	  nationals,	  OJ	  L	  348	  of	  24.12.2008	  64	  All	  EU	  Member	  States	  except	  the	  UK	  and	  Ireland	  are	  bound	  by	  the	  Directive;	  the	  associated	  Schengen	  States	  (Switzerland,	  Norway	  and	  Iceland)	  are	  also	  bound	  by	  the	  Directive.	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The	   issue	  at	  stake	  was	  salient	  not	  only	   for	   the	  Member	  State	  directly	  concerned	   in	   the	  case	  at	  hand	   (Italy)	   but	   also	   for	   others,	   notably	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   France.	   During	   the	   years	  proceeding	  the	  case,	  Italy,	  which	  is	  a	  key	  migrant	  destination	  country	  in	  the	  EU,	  experienced	  ‘an	  intense	  politicization	  of	  migration	  (in	  particular	   irregular	  migration)	  with	  a	  growth	  in	  populist	  and	  xenophobic	  discourse	  led	  by	  Lega	  Nord,	  a	  party	  that	  was	  in	  government	  2001-­‐06	  and	  2008-­‐11’.65	  When	  the	  Berlusconi	  government	  (which	  included	  Lega	  Nord)	  took	  office	  in	  May	  2008,	  it	  was	  too	  late	  for	  it	  to	  influence	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  Directive	  (adopted	  in	  December	  2008)	  but	  it	   could	   and	   did	   determine	   its	   implementation.	   With	   Roberto	   Maroni	   of	   the	   Legal	   Nord	   as	  interior	  minister,	  the	  party’s	  call	  for	  tougher	  measures	  on	  immigration	  and	  security	  were	  soon	  put	   into	  practice.	  Only	  a	   few	  days	  after	   the	  new	  government	   took	  office,	  a	   legislative	  proposal	  was	  adopted	   that	   included	  a	  range	  of	  new	  restrictive	  measures.	  Acosta	  &	  Geddes	   (2013)	  state	  that	  the	  Italian	  government	  was	  surprisingly	  open	  about	  its	  intention	  to	  circumvent	  the	  Return	  Directive.	  The	   El	   Dridi	   case	   regarded	   an	   Algerian	   national	   who	   entered	   Italy	   clandestinely	   and	   never	  obtained	   a	   valid	   residence	   permit.	   After	   having	   been	   requested	   to	   leave	   the	   country	   and	   not	  doing	   so,	   he	   was	   sentenced	   to	   one	   year’s	   imprisonment.	   He	   appealed	   and	   the	   national	   court	  referred	  the	  question	  to	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  asking	  whether	  a	  system	  whereby	  a	  third-­‐country	  national	  could	  be	  imprisoned	  in	  a	  case	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  a	  removal	  order	  was	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Return	  Directive,	  in	  particular	  Articles	  15	  and	  16	  on	  detention.66	  	  Despite	  opposition	   from	  several	  Member	  States,	   the	  Court	  went	   ahead	  and	   in	   its	   ruling	  on	  28	  April	   2011	   it	   ruled	   that	   the	   Directive	   precludes	   national	   rules	   imposing	   a	   prison	   term	   on	   an	  illegally	  staying	  third-­‐country	  national	  who	  does	  not	  comply	  with	  an	  order	  to	  leave	  the	  national	  territory.	  The	  Court	  however	  also	  ruled	  that	  “a	  penalty	  such	  as	  that	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  Italian	  legislation	  is	  liable	  to	  jeopardise	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  objective	  of	  introducing	  an	  effective	  policy	  
                                                      65	  Acosta	  &	  Geddes	  (2013:179)	  66	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  summary	  of	  the	  case,	  see	  Acosta	  &	  Geddes	  (2013:185)	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for	  removal	  and	  repatriation	  in	  keeping	  with	  fundamental	  rights”.67	  Acosta	  &	  Geddes	  (2013)	  describe	  how	  the	  Italian	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  (Roberto	  Maroni)	  reacted	  with	   ire	  and	  stated	   that	   the	   judgment	  was	  a	  problem	  not	  only	   for	   Italy	  but	  also	   for	   the	  rest	  of	  Europe:	  
[I]f	   it	   is	  made	  more	  difficult	   to	  expel	   irregular	  migrants	   this	   is	  not	  only	  a	  problem	  for	   Italy,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe’	  (La	  Republicca,	  2011)68	  
This	  issue	  was	  also	  politicized	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	   ‘where	  the	  July	  2010	  ‘support	  agreement’	  of	  the	  populist	  anti-­‐immigration	  Partij	  voor	  de	  Vrijheid	  (PVV)	  for	  the	  Christian	  Democrat	  CDA	  and	  liberal-­‐conservative	   VVD	   coalition	   government	   had	   included	   a	   proposal	   to	   consider	   irregular	  stay	   in	   the	  Netherlands	   to	  be	  a	  criminal	  offence	   for	  which	  prison	  was	   foreseen’.69	  The	   issue	  of	  detention	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  was	  also	  a	  sensitive	  issue	  in	  France.	  Same	  as	  the	  Imran	  case,	  the	  El	  Dridi	  case	  was	  a	  PPU	  case,	  meaning	  that	  the	  Court’s	  ‘information	  gap’	  is	  stronger	  than	  under	  the	  normal	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure.	  
 3.1.3	  Asylum	  The	  Dublin	   II	   Regulation70	   sets	   out	   the	   criteria	   and	  mechanisms	   for	   determining	   the	  Member	  State	   responsible	   for	   examining	   asylum	   applications	   lodged	   in	   the	   EU.71	   The	   Member	   States	  where	  the	  applicant	  makes	  his	  first	  application	  is	  the	  one	  where	  the	  application	  is	  to	  be	  assessed	  
                                                      67	  Judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  case	  C-­‐61/11	  PPU	  El	  Dridi	  on	  28	  April	  2011,	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  Press	  Release	  No	  40/11	  Luxembourg,	  28	  April	  2011	  Judgment	  in	  Case	  C-­‐61/11	  PPU	  Hassen	  El	  Dridi	  alias	  Soufi	  Karim	  68	  Quoted	  in	  Acosta	  &	  Geddes	  (2013:186)	  69	  Groenendijk,	  Koen.	  (2010)	  ‘Proposals	  for	  Revision	  of	  EU	  Migration	  Law	  and	  International	  Law	  in	  the	  September	  2010	  Dutch	  Coalition	  Agreement’	  70	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  343/2003	  of	  18	  February	  2003	  establishing	  the	  criteria	  and	  mechanisms	  for	  determining	  the	  Member	  State	  responsible	  for	  examining	  an	  asylum	  application	  lodged	  in	  one	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  by	  a	  third-­‐country	  national	  OJ	  L	  50	  of	  25.2.2003	  71	  Kaunert	  &	  Leonard	  (2012)	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and	  if	  the	  applicant	  goes	  to	  another	  Member	  State	  the	  latter	  must	  transfer	  the	  asylum	  seeker	  to	  the	  Member	  State	  responsible.	  The	  Regulation	  was	   enacted	   in	   2003	   following	   lengthy	  negotiations	   and	  political	   deadlock	   for	  years.	   One	   of	   the	   main	   and	   most	   famous	   principles	   of	   the	   Dublin	   II	   Regulation	   is	   that	   the	  Member	  State,	  in	  which	  the	  asylum-­‐seeker	  first	  enters,	  is	  the	  one	  responsible	  for	  processing	  the	  application.	   Given	   the	   uneven	   distribution	   of	   Member	   States	   where	   asylum	   applications	   are	  lodged	  (at	   the	  time	  when	  the	   judgment	  was	   issued,	  Greece	  was	  the	  point	  of	  entry	   in	   the	  EU	  of	  90%	  of	  illegal	   immigrants)	  means	  that	  there	  is	  a	  very	  disproportionate	  burden	  being	  borne	  by	  this	  Member	  State	  compared	  to	  other	  Members	  States,	  thus	  explaining	  the	  high	  political	  salience	  of	  the	  Regulation.	  Case	   C-­‐411/10	   N.S.	   and	   Others	   (hereinafter	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   N.S.	   case)	   on	   the	   ’Dublin	   II’	  Regulation	   (EC)	  No	   343/2003)	   (judgment	   in	  December	   2011)	   comes	   across	   as	   a	   ‘most	   likely’	  case	  given	  the	  high	  political	  salience	  of	  the	  Directive	  in	  general	  and	  the	  legal	  provision	  at	  stake	  in	   the	  preliminary	  ruling	  as	  such.	  More	  specifically,	   the	  case	  regarded	   the	   issue	  of	  whether	  an	  Afghan	  national	  who	  claimed	  asylum	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  after	   travelling	   through	  other	  EU	  Member	   States	   including	   Greece	   could	   be	   sent	   back	   to	   Greece	   despite	   serious	   concerns	  regarding	  the	  conditions	  of	   fundamental	  rights	  of	  asylum-­‐seekers	   in	  that	  country.	  No	  less	  than	  13	  Member	  States	  submitted	  a	  written	  observation	  to	   the	  Court	  (Ireland,	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Belgium,	   the	  Czech	  Republic,	   Germany,	  Greece,	   France,	   Italy,	   the	  Netherlands,	  Austria,	   Poland,	  Slovenia	  and	  Finland),	  which	  points	  to	  the	  high	  political	  salience	  of	  the	  issue	  at	  stake.	  The	  Swiss	  Confederation,	  the	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees,	  Amnesty	  International	  and	  the	  AIRE	  Centre	  also	  intervened.	  Despite	  opposition	  from	  several	  of	  these	  Member	  States,	  in	  its	  judgment	  on	  21	  December	  2011,	  the	  Court	  went	  ahead	  and	  significantly	   limited	  the	  discretion	  of	  sovereignty	  of	  Member	  States.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  precluded	  the	  transfer	  of	   asylum-­‐seekers	   from	  other	  Member	   States	   to	   Greece	   pursuant	   to	   the	   ‘Dublin	   II	   Regulation’	  even	  where	   the	  criteria	   in	   that	  Regulation	  designated	  Greece	  as	   the	  Member	  State	  responsible	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for	  considering	  the	  application.	  The	  Court	  motivated	   its	   judgment	  with	  the	  breaches	  of	  human	  rights	  which	  asylum-­‐seekers	  were	  likely	  to	  face	  in	  Greece.72	  	  3.2.	  Data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  To	  answer	  the	  questions	  for	  research,	  five	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  civil	  servants	  at	  the	  European	   Commission	   were	   carried	   out	   in	   Brussels.	   Interviews	   were	   deemed	   necessary	   to	  obtain	   detailed	   information	   about	   the	   process,	   meaning	   and	   considerations	   made	   during	   the	  process	  of	  determining	   the	  Commission’s	  position	   in	   the	  selected	  cases.73	   Interviews	  allow	   for	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  and	  allow	  the	  respondents	  to	  talk	  freely.	  In	  Tansey’s	  words	  (2007),	  as	  a	  researcher	  it	  is	  thus	  possible	  to	  gather	  rich	  details	  about	  thoughts	  and	  attitudes	  on	  the	  issues	  at	  stake,	   something	   that	   is	   highly	   useful	   to	   answer	   the	   questions	   for	   research	   of	   the	   present	  study.74	   The	  possibility	   of	   conducting	   a	   survey	  was	   not	   considered	   a	   preferable	   alternative	   as	  such	   an	   approach	  would	  not	   have	   allowed	  making	   an	   in-­‐depth	   assessment	   of	   the	   experiences	  and	  perceptions	  of	  the	  actors	  involved.	  In	  addition,	  it	  was	  deemed	  unlikely	  that	  they	  would	  have	  agreed	  to	  put	  such	  considerations	  into	  writing.	  	  The	  interviewees	  were	  selected	  according	  to	  their	  centrality,	  here	  understood	  as	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  process	  of	  determining	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  in	  the	  selected	  cases	  (the	  more	  central,	  the	  better).	  The	  selected	  interviewees	  were	  all	  familiar	  with	  at	  least	   one	   of	   the	   three	   selected	   cases.	   To	   enable	   a	   comprehensive	   understanding	   of	   the	  Commission’s	   interaction,	   both	   civil	   servants	   from	   the	   relevant	   Directorate-­‐General	   and	   the	  Legal	  Service	  were	  interviewed.	  All	  of	  the	  selected	  interviewees	  agreed	  to	  participate.	  In	  accordance	  with	   the	   recommendation	  by	  Lilleker	   (2003)	   to	   increase	   the	  willingness	  among	  potential	  interviewees	  to	  participate,	  they	  received	  information	  about	  the	  research	  project,	  why	  
                                                      72	  Summary	  of	  important	  judgments	  on	  the	  homepage	  of	  the	  Legal	  Service	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/arrets/listepartheme_en.htm#jha	  (accessed	  on	  18	  May	  2014)	  73	  To	  enhance	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  results,	  interview	  guides	  with	  typical	  questions	  that	  were	  used	  are	  annexed	  to	  the	  present	  study.	  74	   Tansey,	   Oisín.	   (2007:766).	   ‘Process	   Tracing	   and	   Elite	   Interviewing:	   A	   Case	   for	   Non-­‐Probability	   Sampling’	  
Political	  Science	  and	  Politics,	  Vol.	  40,	  No.	  4,	  pp.	  765-­‐772	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they	  were	  asked	   to	  participate	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  questions	   they	  would	  be	  asked.75	  As	   the	   first	  interviewees	   refused	   to	   be	   recorded	   on	   tape	   and	   to	   avoid	   a	   situation	  where	   the	   interviewees	  would	   feel	  uncomfortable	   it	  was	  deemed	  preferable	  not	   to	   record	   the	   following	   interviews	  on	  tape	  either.	  Although	  not	   ideal	   (not	   least	   from	  a	  reliability	  point	  of	  view),	   this	  was	  deemed	  an	  acceptable	  approach	  as	  notes	  were	  taken	  during	  the	  interviews	  and	  a	  first	  processing	  of	  the	  data	  took	   place	   straight	   away	   after	   each	   interview	  while	   the	   impressions	   from	   the	   interview	  were	  still	  fresh.	  Additionally,	  the	  questions	  and	  answers	  were	  quite	  straightforward.	  All	   of	   the	   interviews	  but	   one	  were	   carried	  out	   in	  English	   (one	  was	   carried	  out	   in	   French).	  All	  interviews	  but	  one	  were	  carried	  out	  face-­‐to-­‐face.	  They	  typically	  lasted	  for	  1	  hour.	  Well	  aware	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  triangulation	  in	  improving	  the	  validity	  of	  research	  findings	  in	  case	  study	  research,76	   the	  present	  study	  had	   to	  rely	  on	  one	  kind	  of	  empirical	  data	  (the	   interviews).	  The	   reason	   for	   this	  was,	   as	   already	  explained	   in	   the	   introduction,	   that	   the	   information	   sought	  could	   only	   be	   obtained	   from	   the	   interviewees	   themselves.	   To	   the	   extent	   possible,	   their	  statements	  were	  however	  also	  verified	  by	  screening	  the	  observations	  sent	  from	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  to	  the	  Legal	  Service	  in	  two	  of	  the	  three	  cases.	  It	  was	  however	  not	  possible	  to	  verify	  their	  statements	  via	  so-­‐called	  Report	  from	  the	  Hearing	  as	  the	  Court	  ceased	  to	  produce	  such	  reports	  in	  2012.77	  In	  line	  with	  Steinar	  Kvale’s	  reasoning	  on	  qualitative	  interviews	  (2006)	  and	  contrary	  to	  how	  the	  analytical	  stage	  of	  a	   thesis	   is	  often	  described,	   it	  was	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  process	   that	  started	  not	  after,	  but	  already	  during	  the	  interview.	  Notably,	  an	  important	  task	  during	  the	  interviews	  was	  to	  concentrate	  and	  interpret	  what	  the	  interviewee	  said	  (notably	  lines	  of	  reasoning	  that	  are	  vague	  or	   unclear)	   and	   ‘send	   it	   back’	   to	   the	   interviewee	   for	   verification.	   At	   least	   in	   theory,	   such	   an	  approach	   would	   allow	   to	   end	   up	   in	   a	   situation	   where	   there	   is	   only	   one	   possible	   (common)	  interpretation	  of	  what	  the	  interviewee	  is	  saying.78	  
                                                      75	  Lilleker	  (2003:209)	  76	  Compare	  with	  Yin,	  Robert.	  (2009).	  ‘Case	  Study	  Research.	  Design	  and	  Methods.’	  Thousand	  Oaks:	  SAGE	  (4th	  ed.)	  77	  Naurin	  et	  al	  (2013:5)	  78	  Compare	  with	  Kvale	  (2006:171)	  
 30 
The	   following	   step	   of	   analysis	   was	   to	   lay	   the	   puzzle	   of	   what	   the	   process	   is	   like	   and	   what	  considerations	   the	   central	   actors	  made	   in	   the	   specific	   cases	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  preferences	   of	  Member	   States.	   The	   analysis	   included	   an	   attempt	   to	   consider	   interactional	   details	   such	   as	   the	  interviewers’	   talk	   (interaction	   with	   the	   interviewee)	   as	   this	   may	   affect	   the	   production	   of	  content.79	  	  As	  the	  interviews	  were	  not	  recorded	  on	  tape	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  re-­‐process	  the	  interviews	  in	  their	   entirety	   but	   only	   the	   notes	   that	   had	   been	   taken.	   The	   information	   obtained	   in	   each	  interview	   was	   reconsidered	   in	   light	   of	   the	   other	   interviews	   until	   the	   stage	   where	   such	  processing	  no	  longer	  revealed	  new	  relevant	  elements	  to	  the	  analysis.	  	  3.3.	  Ethical	  considerations	  The	   approach	   on	   how	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   interviewees	   was	   guided	   by	   the	   four	   basic	   ethical	  principles	   recommended	   by	   the	   Swedish	  Research	   Council	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   humanistic	   and	  social	   scientific	   research.80	   The	   interviewees	   were	   informed	   about	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   study,	  participation	   was	   subject	   to	   their	   agreement,	   they	   were	   offered	   an	   appropriate	   degree	   of	  
confidentiality	  and	  their	  answers	  were	  used	  for	  scientific	  purposes	  only.	  Yet,	   revealing	   information	   about	   the	   Commission’s	   work	   that	   the	   Commission	   does	   not	  communicate	  about	   itself	   turned	  out	   to	  be	  a	  delicate	  exercise	   from	  an	  ethical	  point	  of	  view.	   In	  Marshall	   &	   Rossman’s	   words,	   interviews	   may	   be	   characterized	   as	   “encounters	   dependent	   on	  trust”81	   and	   already	   during	   the	   first	   interview	   it	   became	   obvious	   that	   the	   interviewee	   was	  willing	  to	  share	  their	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  in	  a	  surprisingly	  open	  way.	  The	  high	  degree	  of	  trust	  that	  I	  experienced	  felt	  somewhat	  problematic,	  as	  it	  would	  have	  been	  easier	  if	  I	  could	  have	  assumed	  that	  they	  would	  not	  share	  any	  information	  that	  could	  harm	  them	  or	  the	  Commission	  if	  
                                                      79	  For	  examples	  of	  how	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  interviewer	  and	  the	  interviewee	  may	  affect	  the	  content,	  see	  Rapley	  (2001:306)	  80	  Vetenskapsrådet	  (2007)	  “Forskningsetiska	  principer	  inom	  humanistisk-­‐samhällsvetenskaplig	  forskning”	  (in	  Swedish)	  81	  Marshall	  &	  Rossman	  (2011)	  
 31 
published.	  From	  a	  reliability	  point	  of	  view	  it	  was	  however	  not	  a	  bad	  thing	  –	  it	  strengthened	  my	  perception	  that	  they	  were	  actually	  sharing	  their	  true	  considerations	  and	  reflections.	  The	  issue	  of	  confidentiality	  also	  called	  for	  reflection	  and	  was	  a	  major	  issue	  when	  designing	  the	  study	  as	  a	  whole	  as	  two	  possible	  and	  alternative	  strategies	  emerged:	  a) To	  offer	   as	  much	  and	  where	  possible	   full	   confidentiality	   to	   increase	   the	   likeliness	   that	  one	   would	   obtain	   a	   rich	   material	   and	   insights	   that	   the	   interviewees	   would	   not	   have	  otherwise	  revealed;	  b) To	   aim	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   a	   specific	   case,	   an	   option	   under	   which	   confidentiality	   is	  problematic	   from	   a	   research	   point	   of	   view	   (as	   the	   inability	   to	   publish	   the	   sources	   of	  information	   might	   raise	   issues	   regarding	   transparency	   and	   scrutiny)	   and	   would	   thus	  only	  be	  sacrificed	  to	  the	  extent	  needed.	  	  Eventually	  I	  decided	  to	  go	  for	  the	  second	  option,	  as	  it	  seemed	  important	  to	  assess	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  political	  bellwether	  assumption	  in	  explaining	  the	  outcome	  in	  real	  cases.	  Yet,	  I	  respected	  the	  request	   of	   the	   interviewees	   not	   to	   display	   their	   names	   in	   the	   final	   product.	   Given	   the	   limited	  number	  of	  civil	  servants	  who	  are	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  preparation	  of	  a	  written	  observation,	  I	  however	  also	  had	  to	  determine	  whether	  to	  also	  avoid	  displaying	  the	  names	  of	  the	  cases	  studied	  to	  offer	   full	   confidentiality.	   In	  practice,	   their	   colleagues	   could	  otherwise	   identify	   interviewees.	  Not	  displaying	  the	  name	  of	  the	  cases	  studied	  would	  however	  have	  undermined	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  study	  as	  a	  whole.	  Albeit	   important,	   these	   ethical	   challenges	   did	   not	   discourage	   from	   using	   the	   proposed	  methodology.	   It	   was	   considered	   satisfactory	   to	   address	   them	   with	   continuous	   reflection	  throughout	   the	   research	   process,	   by	   showing	   openness	   during	   the	   interaction	   with	   the	  interviewees	  and	  by	  reminding	  them	  of	  my	  role	  as	  researcher.	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3.4.	  Credibility	  
The	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  interviewees	  would	  agree	  to	  reveal	  considerations	  that	  determined	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  was	  a	  source	  of	  much	  reflection.	  The	  interviews	  may	  be	  characterized	  as	  elite	   interviews	   and	   the	   interviewees	   thus	   probably	   skilled	   in	   choosing	   an	   (as	   perceived	   by	  them)	  appropriate	  narrative,	  which	  puts	  demands	  on	  the	  interviewer	  in	  assessing	  the	  credibility	  of	   the	   information	   provided.	   For	   instance,	   one	   could	   imagine	   that	   interviewees	   would	   be	  hesitant	  to	  reveal	  political	  considerations	  as	  this	  could	  harm	  the	  Commission’s	  reputation	  (or,	  at	  least,	  its	  ambition	  to	  portray	  itself)	  as	  an	  expert	  witness	  giving	  the	  Court	  the	  benefit	  of	  its	  advice	  in	  legal	  matters.	  	  Although	   in	   agreement	   with	   rational	   choice	   theorists	   who	   question	   whether	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  reach	   the	   ‘hearts	   and	   souls’	   of	   policy-­‐makers,	   it	   was	   considered	   that	   this	   challenge	   could	   be	  addressed	   by	   demonstrating	   preparedness	   during	   the	   interviews,	   engaging	   in	   critical	  assessments	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  interviewees’	  line	  of	  reasoning	  is	  fully	  developed	  and	  reflecting	  on	  possible	  motives	  of	  depicting	  a	  process	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  Knowing	   that	   the	  Commission’s	   internal	  processes	  are	  sensitive	  matters,	   it	   could	  not	  be	   taken	  for	   granted	   that	   the	   interviewees	   would	   agree	   to	   reveal	   considerations	   that	   are	   not	   publicly	  available.	  It	  was	  however	  not	  considered	  likely	  that	  the	  interviewees	  would	  give	  misleading	  or	  even	   false	   information.	  Rather,	   if	   they	  would	  not	  have	  wished	   to	   reveal	   ‘the	   full	   version’,	   they	  could	  easily	  have	  provided	  short	  or	  general	  answers	  to	  the	  questions	  asked	  or	  even	  refused	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  more	  delicate	  questions.	  To	   a	   varying	   degree,	   all	   interviewees	   were	   hesitant	   to	   talk	   about	   their	   knowledge	   of	  considerations	   made	   in	   specific	   cases.	   One	   interviewee	   did	   at	   first	   refuse	   to	   comment	   on	  considerations	   made	   in	   a	   given	   case.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   interview,	   when	   confronted	   with	   the	  assumption	   that	   the	   Commission	   considers	   Member	   States’	   preferences,	   the	   interviewee	  however	  came	  back	  to	  the	  issue	  and	  denied	  that	  such	  considerations	  took	  place.	  The	   frank	   attitude,	   with	   which	   some	   of	   the	   interviewees	   elaborated	   on	   their	   views	   and	  experience	  (as	  shall	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  cannot	  but	  be	  taken	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  true	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considerations.	  	  3.5.	  Limitations	  	  Although	   the	  cases	  of	   the	  present	  study	  were	  strategically	  selected	  and	  represent	   ‘most	   likely’	  cases	  in	  a	  ‘most	  likely’	  policy	  area,	  none	  of	  them	  constitute	  a	  constitutional	  landmark	  case	  in	  the	  sense	   defined	   by	   Stein	   (1981).	   Consequently,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   exclude	   a	   relevance	   of	   the	  political	   bellwether	   assumption	   in	   explaining	   the	   historical	   development	   of	   European	   legal	  integration	   through	   the	   landmark	  constitutional	   cases	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	  quasi-­‐constitutional	  legal	   order	   of	   today.	   Put	   differently,	   the	   findings	   will	   not	   allow	   determining	   whether	   the	  Commission	   did	   consider	   Member	   States’	   preferences	   in	   the	   historical	   cases	   that	   radically	  changed	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  	  In	   addition,	   as	   only	   three	   cases	   are	   examined,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   generalize	   the	   results	   in	   a	  quantitative	  sense.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  the	  way	  these	  dossiers	  are	  dealt	  with	  has	  varied	  over	  time.	  In	  addition,	  the	  case	  study	  approach	  does	  not	  allow	  fleshing	  out	  (systematic)	  trends	  or	  insights	  into	  the	  gradual	  development	  of	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  system.	  	  Also,	  it	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  that	  additional	  interviews	  would	  have	  revealed	  further	  new	  elements	  relevant	   to	   assess	   the	   political	   bellwether	   assumption.	   Yet,	   there	   are	   no	   particular	   reasons	   to	  presume	   that	   the	   views	   of	   the	   five	   selected	   interviewees	  would	   differ	   from	   that	   of	   other	   civil	  servants	  in	  the	  Commission.	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4.	  Results	  	  4.1.	  Meaning	  
	  a)	  Are written	  observations	  best	  characterized	  as	  contributions	  to	  a	  process	  of	  developing	  
EU	  law	  or	  as	  indicators	  of	  political	  acceptability	  among	  Member	  States?	  The	   interviewees	  were	  all	  asked	  about	   the	  objective	  of	   the	  Commission’s	  written	  observations	  and	  none	  considered	  that	  these	  should	  reflect	  political	  acceptability	  among	  Member	  States.	  On	  the	   contrary,	   when	   confronted	   with	   this	   assumption	   they	   argued	   that	   Member	   States’	  preferences	   were	   irrelevant	   in	   this	   regard.	   In	   explaining	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   Commission’s	  interventions,	  all	   interviewees	  stressed	  the	  role	  of	   the	  Commission	  as	  guardian	  of	   the	   treaties.	  Two	  also	  referred	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  promoting	  the	  general	  interest	  of	  the	  Union.	  The	   replies	   from	   the	   interviewees	   show	   that	   they	   rather	   conceived	   of	   the	   Commission’s	  intervention	  as	  a	  way	  to	  contribute	  to	  developing	  EU	   law.	  On	  this,	   two	   interviewees	  described	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure	  as	  a	  way	  to	  obtain	  a	  policy	  outcome	  that	  could	  not	  be	  obtained	  during	  negotiations	  with	  Member	  States	  on	  the	  legislation	  in	  question.	  When	  asked	  to	  clarify	  this	  reasoning,	  one	  civil	  servant	  in	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  was	  unexpectedly	  frank	  on	  this	  point:	  
In	  a	  way,	  you	  could	  see	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure	  as	  way	  to	  obtain	  what	  could	  not	  be	  obtained	  during	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  Directive….	  a	  request	  for	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  is	  a	  bit	  like	  a	  gift	  from	  heaven	  when	  it	  arrives.82	  
The	   above	   quote	   reveals	   a	   rationale	   according	   to	   which	   the	   civil	   servant	   even	   welcomes	   the	  opportunity	   to	   go	   against	   the	   preferences	   of	   Member	   States.	   Similarly,	   another	   interviewee	  described	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure	   as	   a	   way	   to	   contribute	   to	   putting	   an	   end	   to	  questionable	  conditions	  regarding	  the	  treatment	  of	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  that	  are	  sanctioned	  by	  Member	  States	  and	  referred	  to	  a	  specific	  case	  as	  being	  useful	  in	  this	  regard:	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It	  was	  a	  well-­‐selected	  case	   [by	   the	  national	   court,]	   that	  allowed	  us	   to	  move	   forward	   in	   the	  direction	  we	  wanted	  to	  go.83	  
One	   interviewee	  however	   refused	   to	   see	  preliminary	   rulings	  as	   a	   tool	   for	  policy	  development,	  arguing	   that	   it	   was	   not	   for	   the	   Commission	   to	   use	   the	   procedure	   in	   such	   a	   way	   if	   it	   meant	  sacrificing	   legal	   quality.	   When	   confronted	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   Commission	   could	   use	   the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure	  to	  pursue	  its	  policy	  preferences,	  this	  interviewee	  reacted	  strongly,	  arguing	  that	  his/her	  role	  was	  to	  make	  the	  best	  possible	  legal	  analysis	  of	  the	  given	  case:	  
…	  when	  drafting	  the	  proposal	  to	  the	  Legal	  Service,	  it	  is	  about	  intellectual	  honesty,	  my	  honesty	  as	  a	  civil	  servant	  is	  at	  stake,	  what	  I	  think	  as	  a	  lawyer.	  I	  sometimes	  start	  off	  thinking	  that	  I	  will	  propose	  A,	  but	  then	  I	  assess	  all	  facts	  and	  elements	  and	  reach	  conclusion	  B.84	  
According	   to	   this	   interviewee,	   if	   the	   outcome	   of	   such	   an	   analysis	   coincided	   with	   the	   policy	  preferences	  of	  the	  Commission,	  this	  was	  nothing	  but	  a	  lucky	  coincidence.	  	  When	  asked	  about	  the	  Commission’s	  judicial	  strategy	  of	  submitting	  written	  observations	  to	  the	  Court	  in	  all	  preliminary	  rulings,	  one	  interviewee	  argued	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  was	  necessary	  to	  live	   up	   to	   the	   obligation	   conferred	   to	   the	   Commission	   as	   guardian	   of	   the	   treaties.85	   The	   same	  interviewee	  interestingly	  also	  described	  this	  strategy	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  enhancing	  credibility	  in	  front	  of	   the	   Court	   to	   remain	   influent	   over	   time.	   The	   alternative	   strategy	   according	   to	   which	   the	  Commission	  would	  ‘pick	  and	  choose’	  cases	  in	  which	  to	  intervene	  (as	  Member	  States	  do)	  would	  risk	  making	  the	  Commission	  come	  across	  as	  political	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Court.86	  The	  interviewees	  in	  the	  Legal	  Service	  both	  stressed	  the	  importance	  for	  the	  Commission	  in	  being	  consistent	   in	   its	   legal	   interpretations	  horizontally	  (across	  policy-­‐areas)	  and	  over	   time.	  On	  this,	  the	   same	   interviewee	   also	   hypothesized	   that	   Member	   States	   that	   used	   a	   more	   consistent	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approach	   and	   that	   sent	   the	   same	   lawyers	   repeatedly	  were	  more	   influential	   in	   the	   Court	   over	  time	  as	  such	  an	  approach	  allowed	  the	  lawyers	  to	  build	  up	  useful	  experience.	  87	  When	  asked	  about	  awareness	  of	  Member	  States’	  preferences,	  all	  interviewees	  to	  varying	  degree	  said	  that	  they	  were	  aware	  of	  Member	  States’	  preferences,	  although	  unwilling	  to	  elaborate	  on	  this	  topic	  in	  more	  detail.	  One	  interviewee	  explained	  that	  Member	  States’	  written	  observations	  to	  the	  Court	  were	  considered	  insofar	  as	  they	  brought	  about	  new	  legal	  or	  factual	  elements	  to	  the	  case.	  Yet,	   the	   same	   interviewee	   stressed	   that	   the	   written	   observations	   were	   not	   relevant	   for	   the	  Commission	  per	  se	  and	  in	  any	  case	  not	  as	  indicators	  of	  political	  acceptability.	  	  4.2.	  Process	  
b)	  ’Is	  the	  process	  of	  determining	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  best	  characterized	  as	  one	  driven	  
by	  legal	  or	  political	  considerations?’	  The	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  interviewees	  suggests	  that	  the	  process	  is	  twofold	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   both	   the	   policy	   Directorate-­‐General	   and	   the	   Legal	   Service	   are	   involved.	   The	   Directorate-­‐General	  sends	  written	  observations	  to	  the	  Legal	  Service	  who	  then	  drafts	  the	  written	  observation	  to	  the	  Court.	  This	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  suitable	  modus	  operandi	  as	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  is	  the	  service	  that	  knows	  the	  content	  and	  background	  of	  the	  issue	  at	  stake.	  When	  asked	  about	  the	  role	  of	   the	   Directorate-­‐Generals	   in	   the	   process	   of	   deciding	   on	   the	   Commission’s	   position,	   the	  reflections	  of	  the	  member	  of	  the	  Legal	  Service	  suggested	  the	  process	  in	  the	  Directorate-­‐Generals	  is	  policy-­‐driven:	  
They	  are	  the	  policy	  Directorate-­‐Generals.	  They	  know	  the	  policies,	  how	  the	  policy	  field	  has	  developed	  over	  time,	  how	  it	  has	  been	  implemented	  so	  far,	   the	  political	  context,	  etc.	  They	  are	  thus	  best	  placed	  to	  propose	  the	  Commission's	  position.88	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The	  length,	  content	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  Directorate-­‐Generals’	  written	  observations	  to	  the	  Legal	  Service	   vary.	   According	   to	   one	   interviewee,	   the	   proposals	   made	   by	   the	   Directorate-­‐General	  typically	   contains	   a	   description	   of	   what	   the	   Commission	   sought	   to	   achieve	   with	   the	   legal	  provision	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (when	  proposing	  the	  legislation)	  and	  what	  the	  negotiations	  on	  the	  provision	  were	  like.	  To	  supply	  the	  Legal	  Service	  with	  more	  detailed	  information	  on	  this,	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  sometimes	  annexes	  minutes	  from	  the	  discussions	  in	  the	  Council.89	  The	  interviewees	   described	   the	   content	   of	   the	   Directorate-­‐Generals’	   written	   observations	   as	   the	  ‘history	  of	  the	  file’90	  or	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  background	  analysis91.	  	  Given	   that	   the	   Legal	   Service	   is	   in	   charge	   of	   drafting	   the	   written	   observation	   and	   ultimately	  deciding	   upon	   the	   Commission’s	   position,	   its	   considerations	   and	   interests	   determine	   the	  outcome	  of	  this	  process.	  The	  members	  of	  the	  Legal	  Service	  both	  described	  the	  Legal	  Service	  as	  being	   at	   the	   service	   of	   the	   Directorate-­‐Generals;	   yet	   they	   said	   that	   their	   legal	   interpretation	  determines	   the	   process.	   This	   view	   may	   be	   exemplified	   with	   the	   account	   of	   one	   of	   the	  interviewees:	  
You	  could	  say	  that	  we	  are	  their	  [the	  Directorate-­‐General’s]	  lawyers.	  We	  try	  to	  accommodate	  them	  but	  must	  of	  course	  ensure	  that	  we	  don't	   jeopardize	   the	  overall	  credibility	  of	   the	  Commission	   in	  front	  of	  the	  Court.	  We	  need	  to	  consistent	  to	  be	  influential.	  We	  need	  to	  ensure	  an	  overall	  high	  legal	  quality	  and	  consistence	  with	  the	  Treaty.	  That	  is	  our	  concern	  at	  the	  Legal	  Service.92	  
Both	   members	   of	   the	   Legal	   Service	   stressed	   the	   need	   to	   ensure	   a	   high	   probability	   that	   the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  will	  be	  taken	  on	  board	  by	  the	  Court.	  According	  to	  one	  interviewee	  in	  the	  Legal	  Service,	  the	  typical	  reason	  for	  disagreement	  (or	  at	  least	  diverging	  views)	  between	  the	  two	  services	  was	  the	  willingness	  to	  take	  the	  risk	  of	   ‘loosing’	   in	  front	  of	  the	  Court	  (in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  is	  not	  taken	  on	  board	  by	  the	  Court).	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  Legal	  Service	  (as	   compared	   to	   the	   Directorate-­‐Generals)	   is	   more	   concerned	   about	   winning,	   while	   the	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Directorate-­‐Generals	   are	  more	  willing	   to	   take	   the	   risk	   of	   “loosing”	   in	   front	   of	   the	   Court	   if	   the	  potential	  gains	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  outcome	  are	  high	  enough	  in	  a	  given	  case.	  One	  interviewee	  had	  the	   impression	   that	   the	  members	   of	   the	  Legal	   Service	   varied	   in	   their	  willingness	   to	   take	   such	  risks.93	  The	  account	  of	  one	  interviewee	  however	  revealed	  that	  there	  are	  hesitations	  to	  take	  a	  too	  high	  risk	  as	  the	  Court’s	  judgments	  may	  have	  a	  constraining	  effect	  on	  the	  Commission:	  
Will	  we	  really	  be	  better	  off	  if	  we	  push	  for	  an	  even	  more	  rights	  enhancing	  line	  and	  the	  Court	  does	  not	  follow?	  Arguably	  not,	  then	  we	  risk	  ending	  up	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  we	  have	  less	  protection	  for	  these	   groups	   of	   people	   than	   before.	   Maybe	   it	   is	   better	   to	   have	   our	   views	   in	   our	   own	  communications	  and	  guidelines…	  and	  not	  put	  them	  at	  risk.94	  
One	  interviewee	  in	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  also	  explained	  that	  the	  Legal	  Service	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  reconciling	  different	  interests	  between	  different	  Directorate-­‐Generals	  and	  that	  in	  this	  sense	  the	  Legal	   Service	   limits	   the	   prospect	   for	   political	   considerations	   to	   determine	   the	   Commission’s	  position.	  The	   interviewees	   in	   the	   Legal	   Services	   both	   argued	   that	   if	   any	   political	   considerations	   were	  made	   during	   the	   course	   of	   determining	   the	   Commission’s	   position,	   such	   considerations	   took	  place	  within	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  and	  the	  Legal	  Service	  was	  not	  necessarily	  aware	  of	  these:	  
It	  might	  well	   be	   that	   Directorate-­‐Generals	   take	   political	   opposition	   among	  Member	   States	   into	  account	  when	  proposing	  how	  to	  act	   in	   front	  of	   the	  Court.	   I	  don’t	   see	  anything	  strange	   in	   that,	   I	  don’t	   see	   the	   drama.	   History	   shows	   that	   the	   political	   context	   changes,	   national	   governments	  change,	  even	  the	  Commission	  changes.	  This	  is	  a	  natural	  development.	  Society	  changes	  as	  a	  whole.	  So,	  you	  never	  really	  know	  what	  the	  future	  will	  bring	  anyways.95	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4.3.	  Specific	  cases	  The	   interviewees	  were	   also	   asked	   about	   considerations	  made	   in	   the	   three	   specific	   cases:	   the	  
Imran	  case	  (case	  C-­‐155/11	  PPU	  Imran),	  the	  El	  Dridi	  case	  (C-­‐61/11	  PPU)	  and	  the	  N.S.	  case	  (case	  C-­‐411/10).	  Although	  to	  a	  varying	  degree	  willing	  to	  elaborate	  on	  considerations	  made	  in	  specific	  cases,	  the	  accounts	   of	   the	   interviewees	  were	   straightforward	   and	   left	   no	   doubts	   regarding	   their	   lines	   of	  reasoning	  as	  regards	  Member	  States’	  preferences.	  The	   interviewees	   were	   asked	   to	   validate	   the	   selected	   cases	   as	   ‘most	   likely’	   cases	   in	   the	  respective	  policy	  area	  and	  agreed	  that	  these	  could	  be	  seen	  this	  way	  compared	  to	  other	  cases.	  To	  a	  varying	  degree,	  they	  confirmed	  that	  the	  Commission	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  preferences	  of	  Member	  States	   at	   the	   point	   in	   time	   when	   the	   Commission’s	   written	   observation	   to	   the	   Court	   was	  determined	  (‘such	  information	  slips	  in	  through	  different	  ways’96,	  ‘well,	  I	  read	  the	  news’97,	  ‘as	  you	  know,	   we	   work	   in	   Brussels’98).	   They	   all	   however	   strongly	   opposed	   the	   idea	   that	   such	  preferences	   would	   have	   fed	   the	   Commission’s	   assessment.	   When	   asked	   whether	   the	   written	  observations	   to	   the	   Legal	   Service	   contained	   any	   such	   assessments	   (regarding	   the	   risks	   for	  legislative	   override	   and/or	   non-­‐compliance	   and/or	   an	   assessment	   on	   how	   far	  Member	   States	  could	  be	  pushed	  towards	  enhanced	   legal	   integration),	   they	  denied	  that	   it	  would	  have	  been	  the	  case.	   A	   screening	   of	   the	   written	   observations	   sent	   by	   the	   Directorate-­‐General	   to	   the	   Legal	  Service	  in	  the	  El	  Dridi	  case	  and	  the	  Imran	  case	  confirm	  these	  claims.99	  Some	  interviewees	  explicitly	  stated	  that	  considering	  Member	  States’	  preferences	  was	  never	  an	  option	  as	  it	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  duties	  under	  the	  Treaty	  (as	  guardian	  of	  EU	  law).100	   Similarly,	   none	   of	   the	   interviewees	   saw	   that	   risks	   for	   legislative	   override	   or	   non-­‐compliance	   among	  Member	   States	  were	   relevant	   for	   the	  Commission	  under	   this	   procedure	   as	  
                                                      96	  EC	  official	  2	  (Directorate-­‐General)	  97	  EC	  official	  1	  (Legal	  Service)	  98	  EC	  official	  5	  (Legal	  Service)	  99	  See	  written	  observations	  of	  DG	  Home	  Affairs	  to	  the	  Legal	  Service	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  in	  case	  C-­‐155/11	  Imran	  (sent	  to	  the	  Legal	  Service	  on	  27	  April	  2011)	  and	  case	  C-­‐61/11	  PPU	  El	  Dridi	  100	  EC	  official	  2	  (Directorate-­‐General)	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the	   Commission	   has	   monopoly	   on	   proposing	   new	   EU	   law.	   On	   this,	   one	   interviewee	   simply	  replied:	  
So	  what?	  We	  have	  the	  right	  of	  initiative.101	  
On	   the	   risk	   for	   non-­‐compliance,	   one	   interviewee	   states	   that	   this	   was	   indeed	   a	   possible	  consequence	  of	  a	  controversial	  ruling.	  According	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  this	  interviewee,	  Member	  States	  sometimes	  find	  ways	  to	  circumvent	  the	  Court’s	  rulings	  by	  adjusting	  their	  legislations	  in	  a	  way	   that	   these	   complied	   with	   the	   ruling	   while	   still	   not	   changing	   the	   way	   things	   were	  implemented	   in	   practice.102	   This	   did	  not	   however	  have	   any	   implications	   for	   the	  Commission’s	  assessment.	  When	  asked	  why	  Member	  States’	  preferences	  were	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  a	  given	  case	  despite	  the	  risk	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  or	  legislative	  override,	  the	  interviewee	  simply	  replied:	  
Well	  no,	  because	  our	  assessment	  is	  based	  on	  a	  different	  analysis.	  We	  simply	  considered	  that	  the	  Member	  States	  were	  wrong.103	  
The	  same	  interviewee	  questioned	  the	  question	  as	  a	  whole:	  
Why	  would	  anyone	   in	   the	  Court	   think	   that	   the	  Commission	  adjusts	   its	  position	  according	   to	  an	  assessment	   of	   Member	   States?	   At	   least	   in	   my	   policy-­‐area	   [asylum],	   it	   is	   obvious	   that	   the	  Commission	  does	  not	  always	  agree	  with	  Member	  States.104	  
The	  interviewees	  all	  shared	  the	  consideration	  that	  the	  assessment	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  Court	  would	   be	   likely	   to	   take	   a	   given	   proposal	   on	   board	   was	   the	   major	   factor	   limiting	   the	  Commission’s	   scope	   of	   manoeuvre	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   Commission	   would	   not	   propose	  something	  that	  was	  not	  likely	  to	  ‘fly’	  in	  the	  Court.	  To	  sum	  up,	  the	  interviewees	  all	  opposed	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  Commission	  would	  consider	  Member	  States’	  preferences	  to	  identify	  a	  politically	  acceptable	  position.	  They	  refused	  such	  reasoning	  on	  
                                                      101	  EC	  official	  2	  (Directorate-­‐General)	  102	  EC	  official	  2	  (Directorate-­‐General)	  103	  EC	  official	  5	  (Directorate-­‐General)	  104	  EC	  official	  5	  (Directorate-­‐General)	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several	  grounds,	  notably	  that	   it	  was	  not	  considered	  relevant	   (‘why	  should	  we?’105	   ‘our	   job	  is	  to	  guard	  the	  EU	  law’106)	  or	  legitimate	  (‘would	  be	  contrary	  to	  our	  role	  as	  guardians	  of	  the	  treaty’107).	  	  	  5.	  Analysis	  
The	  empirical	  findings	  reveal	  logics	  that	  are	  rather	  different	  from	  those	  put	  forward	  by	  previous	  research.	  Notably,	  the	  empirical	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  written	  observations	  to	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   are	   better	   characterized	   as	   contributions	   to	   a	   process	   of	  developing	   EU	   law	   than	   as	   indicators	   of	   political	   acceptability	   among	  Member	   States.	   In	   fact,	  none	  of	  the	  interviewees	  considered	  that	  political	  acceptability	  among	  Member	  States	  would	  be	  a	   relevant	  aspect	   for	   the	  Commission	  when	  determining	   its	  position	  under	   this	  procedure.	  On	  the	  contrary:	  they	  strongly	  opposed	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  would	  be	  the	  case.	  Their	  accounts	  of	  the	  purpose	  and	  meaning	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  written	  observations	  show	  that	  they	   see	   them	   as	   contributions	   to	   the	   development	   of	   EU	   law.	   Interestingly,	   the	   interviews	  revealed	  two	  different	  viewpoints	   in	  this	  regard:	  one	  seeing	  the	  written	  observations	  as	  a	  way	  for	   the	   Commission	   to	   pursue	   its	   policy	   interests	   and	   the	   other	   stressing	   the	   objective	   of	  supplying	  the	  Court	  with	  the	  best	  possible	  legal	  analysis.	  It	  appears	  from	  the	  interviews	  that	  the	  views	  of	  individual	  civil	  servants	  in	  the	  Directorate-­‐Generals	  may	  influence	  and	  even	  determine	  the	  task	  of	  striking	  the	  balance	  between	  these	  two	  visions.	  	  The	  internal	  procedures	  do	  allow	  political	  considerations	  to	  feed	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  but	  only	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   do	   not	   jeopardize	   the	   overall	   credibility	   of	   the	   Commission	   as	   a	  provider	   of	   legal	   expertise	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   Court.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   Legal	   Service	   acts	   as	   a	  
                                                      105	  EC	  official	  5	  (Directorate-­‐General)	  106	  EC	  official	  2	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gatekeeper	   to	   ensure	   an	   overall	   high	   legal	   quality	   and	   horizontal	   consistency	   in	   the	   legal	  interpretations.	  These	   findings	   suggest	   that	   the	   Commission,	   rather	   than	   a	   political	   bellwether,	   is	   better	  described	  as	  a	  (political)	  activist	   that	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  EU	  law	  in	   line	  with	   its	   policy	   preferences	   or	   legal	   analysis	   irrespective	   of	   whether	   such	   an	   assessment	   is	  politically	  acceptable	  to	  Member	  States.	  Importantly,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  limits	  to	  such	  activism	  are	  not	  set	  by	  Member	  States’	  preferences	  but	   by	   expectations	   regarding	  whether	   a	   given	   position	   is	   convincing	   enough	   to	   be	   taken	   on	  board	   by	   the	   Court.	   Given	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   Legal	   Service	   in	  maintaining	   and	   enhancing	   the	  Commission’s	   influence	   horizontally	   (across	   policy-­‐areas)	   and	   over	   time,	   this	   service	   is	  more	  likely	  to	  sacrifice	  potential	  gains	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  outcome	  in	  a	  given	  case	  than	  the	  Directorate-­‐General.	  	  Interestingly,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  willingness	  to	  take	  such	  risks	  varies	  in	  the	  Legal	  Service	  and	  that	  the	  degree	  of	   risk-­‐taking	   is	  determined	  by	   the	  views	  of	   its	   individual	  members.	  Hesitations	   to	  taking	   such	   risks	   however	   also	   exist	   in	   the	   Directorate-­‐Generals	   as	   they	   see	   a	   risk	   that	   the	  Court’s	   judgments	   may	   restrict	   their	   possibility	   to	   promote	   their	   policy	   preferences	   in	   the	  future.	   As	   an	   alternative	   to	   Burley	  &	  Mattli’s	   (1993)	   reasoning	   (according	   to	  which	   the	   Court	  follows	   the	   ‘political’	   lead	   of	   the	   Commission),	   it	   might	   be	   more	   adequate	   to	   think	   of	   the	  Commission	   following	   the	   Court	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   Commission	   determines	   its	   position	   in	  accordance	  with	  expectations	  on	  whether	  a	  given	  proposal	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  taken	  on	  board	  by	  the	  Court.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  empirical	  findings,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  the	  political	  bellwether	  assumption	  fits	  into	   recent	   quantitative	   literature	   such	   as	   the	   analysis	   of	   Carrubba,	   Gabel	   and	  Hankla	   (2012)	  that	   seeks	   to	   explain	   the	   high	   success	   rate	   of	   the	   Commission	   under	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	  procedure.	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For	  neofunctional	  scholars,	  these	  findings	  imply	  that	  they	  should	  revisit	  their	  argumentation	  in	  explaining	  the	  sizable	  impact	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  the	  Court	  and	  on	  why	  the	  Court	  is	  so	  keen	  to	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  Commission.	  For	   the	   intergovernmental	   scholars	   Carrubba,	   Gabel	   and	   Hankla,	   the	   empirical	   findings	   have	  slightly	   different	   implications.	   Notably,	   the	   findings	   have	   implications	   for	   their	   theoretical	  model,	  where	   the	  position	  of	   the	  Advocate-­‐General	   serves	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   the	   legal	  merits	   of	   a	  case.	   If	   the	   Commission’s	   position	   in	   some	   cases	   represents	   the	   Commission’s	   best	   legal	  interpretation	   (as	   the	   empirical	   findings	   of	   the	   present	   study	   suggest),	   this	   implies	   that	  Carrubba,	   Gabel	   and	   Hankla	   have	   two	   variables	   measuring	   the	   same	   phenomena:	   the	   legal	  merits	  of	  the	  case.	  In	  addition,	  if	  the	  Commission	  in	  some	  cases	  intervenes	  as	  a	  policy	  activist,	  it	  not	   really	   clear	   what	   role	   the	   Commission	   variable	   should	   have	   in	   their	   theoretical	   model	  discussing	  the	  influence	  of	  Member	  States.	  	  As	  discussed	   in	   the	   theoretical	   framework,	   the	  empirical	   findings	  do	  however	  not	  rule	  out	   the	  possibility	  that	  the	  Court	  is	  receptive	  to	  threats	  of	  legislative	  override	  and/or	  non-­‐compliance	  by	  Member	  States.	  It	  could	  simply	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  Court	  considers	  these	  directly	  and	  not,	  as	  the	  political	   bellwether	   assumption	   presumes,	   by	   using	   the	   Commission	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   political	  acceptability.	  As	  regards	  alternative	  explanations	  to	  the	  high	  success	  rate	  of	  the	  Commission,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  Court	  simply	   is	   responsive	   to	   the	  pro-­‐integrationist	  agenda	  of	   the	  Commission,	  or	   that	   the	  Commission’s	  success	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  its	  expertise,	  resources,	  perceived	  neutrality	  as	  well	  as	   the	   judicial	   strategy	   as	   a	   ‘repeat	   player’	   in	   front	   of	   the	   Court	   under	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	  procedure	  (as	  compared	  to	  Member	  States,	  who	  only	  intervene	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis)	  and/or	  the	   lack	   of	   resources	   at	   the	   Court,	   which	   forces	   the	   Court	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   Commission’s	   legal	  expertise.	  These	  were	  all	  factors	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  interviewees	  when	  asked	  to	  offer	  their	  view	  on	  why	  the	  Court	  often	  follows	  the	  Commission.	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6.	  Conclusion	  
 6.1.	  The	  European	  Commission:	  A	  political	  bellwether?	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  to	  assess	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  Commission	  acts	  as	  a	  political	  bellwether	  when	  interacting	  with	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  under	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure.	  Thereby,	  and	  on	  a	  more	  general	  level,	  the	  present	  study	  sought	   to	   contribute	   to	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	   two	  institutions	  under	  this	  procedure.	  As	  a	   first	  remark,	   it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	   the	  exercise	  of	  carrying	  out	   interviews	  with	  central	  actors	  at	  the	  European	  Commission	  proved	  useful	  to	  this	  end.	  The	  interviews	  revealed	  a	  notable	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  reasoning	  made	  by	  neofunctional	  scholars	  and	  the	  practical	  experience	  of	  central	  actors	  involved	  in	  these	  processes.	  Secondly,	   it	  may	  be	   concluded	   that	   the	  Commission’s	  written	  observations	   to	   the	  Court	   in	   the	  three	  selected	  cases	  are	  better	  characterized	  as	  contributions	  to	  a	  process	  of	  developing	  EU	  law	  than	  as	  indicators	  of	  political	  acceptability	  among	  Member	  States.	  On	  this,	  the	  findings	  are	  clear.	  In	  fact,	  the	  interviews	  did	  not	  reveal	  any	  signs	  that	  Member	  States’	  preferences	  played	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  in	  these	  cases.	  Rather	  than	  a	  political	  bellwether,	  it	  thus	  appears	   that	   the	  Commission	   is	   better	  described	   as	   an	   activist	   that	   seeks	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  development	   of	   EU	   law	   in	   line	   with	   its	   policy	   preferences	   or	   legal	   analysis,	   irrespective	   of	  whether	  such	  a	  line	  is	  acceptable	  to	  Member	  States.	  Interestingly,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  limits	  to	  such	  activism	  are	  not	  set	  by	  the	  preferences	  of	  Member	  States	  but	  by	  expectations	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  given	  position	  will	  be	  taken	  on	  board	  by	  the	  Court.	  	  A	   few	   remarks	   on	   the	   policy	   implications	   of	   these	   conclusions	   can	   also	   be	   made.	   As	   history	  shows	   that	   preliminary	   rulings	   often	   have	   significant	   policy	   implications	   and	   as	   they	   have	  authoritative	  effect	  in	  all	  Member	  States,	  Member	  States	  might	  usefully	  dedicate	  more	  resources	  to	  monitor	  and	  influence	  them.	  Some	  Member	  States	  seem	  to	  have	  reached	  the	  same	  conclusion	  as	  they	  have	  established	  mechanisms	  and	  dedicated	  resources	  to	  supervise	  preliminary	  rulings	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and	   control	   national	   courts’	   references	   to	   the	   Court.	   Yet,	   one	   may	   wonder	   whether	   Member	  States	  are	  still	  to	  fully	  realise	  what	  William	  Wallace	  (1982)	  called	  ‘the	  gradual	  draining	  away	  of	  their	  lifeblood	  to	  Brussels’.108	  	  For	  Member	   States	   that	   are	   hesitant	   to	   this	   on-­‐going	   legal	   integration,	   the	   empirical	   findings	  may	  come	  as	  bad	  news,	  as	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  Commission	  is	  rather	  unreceptive	  to	  their	  threats	  of	  legislative	  override	  and/or	  non-­‐compliance.	  Yet,	  the	  present	  study	  does	  not	  reveal	  whether	  (and	  if	   so,	   to	   what	   extent)	   Member	   States	   actively	   seek	   to	   influence	   the	   Commission’s	   position.	   It	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  that	  such	  efforts	  could	  prove	  successful	  in	  this	  regard.	  Given	  the	  high	  success	  rate	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  preliminary	  rulings,	  such	  a	  strategy	  may	  be	  worth	  trying.	  
 6.2.	  Avenues	  for	  further	  research	  By	   demonstrating	   that	   central	   actors	   in	   the	   European	   Commission	   did	   not	   consider	   Member	  States’	   preferences	   when	   determining	   the	   Commission’s	   written	   observation	   to	   the	   Court	   in	  three	   ‘most	   likely’	   preliminary	   rulings,	   the	   present	   study	   has	   ruled	   out	   one	   prominent	  assumption	  regarding	  how	  to	  understand	  the	  Commission’s	  sizable	  impact	  on	  the	  Court’s	  rulings	  under	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure.	  In	  terms	  of	  further	  research,	  it	  seems	  highly	  relevant	  to	  carry	  out	  further	  empirical	  research	  to	  assess	  alternative	  explanations	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  high	  success	  rate.	  Although	  probably	  challenging	  from	  a	  practical	  point	  of	  view,	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  central	  actors	  at	  the	  Court	  could	  constitute	  a	  fruitful	  path	  in	  this	  regard.	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Appendices	  Appendix	  1:	  Interview	  guide	  
	  
Process	  1. How	  would	  you	  describe	   the	  Commission’s	   interaction	  with	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  under	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure?	  -­‐ The	  role	  of	  your	  service	  in	  the	  process	  of	  issuing	  a	  written	  observation	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  role	  of	  other	  services	  involved	  in	  this	  process?	  -­‐ Based	   on	   your	   experience,	   what	   is	   the	   most	   common	   reason	   for	   disagreement	  between	  the	  Directorate-­‐Generals	  and	  the	  Legal	  Service?	  Could	  you	  please	  elaborate?	  
Meaning	  2. In	   your	   view/based	   on	   your	   experience,	   why	   does	   the	   Commission	   submit	   written	  observations	  to	  the	  Court?	  -­‐ Purpose	  (goal)?	  	  
Specific	  cases	  3. References	   for	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  can	  be	  more	  or	   less	  controversial.	   I	  am	  thinking	  of	  the	  degree	   to	  which	   the	   rulings	  could	   lead	   to	  more	   legal	   integration	  and	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  Member	  States	  oppose	  more	  legal	  integration	  in	  such	  cases.	  	  4. At	  the	  point	  in	  time	  when	  the	  Commission’s	  position	  in	  case	  X	  was	  determined,	  were	  you	  aware	  of	  the	  preferences	  of	  Member	  States?	  -­‐ If	   yes,	   did	   this	   awareness	   feed	   the	   assessment	   of	   your	   service?	   Could	   you	   please	  elaborate?	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-­‐ Although	   this	   was	   a	   sensitive	   issue	   to	   Member	   States,	   the	   Commission	   did	   not	  hesitate	  to	  propose	  to	  enhance	  legal	  integration.	  Could	  you	  help	  me	  understand	  why?	  -­‐ Did	  you	   see	   a	   risk	   that	  Member	   States	  might	  not	   comply	  with	   the	   judgment	  of	   the	  Court?	  (Why,	  why	  not?)	  -­‐ Did	  you	  see	  a	  risk	  that	  Member	  States	  might	  call	  for	  amendments	  of	  the	  Directive	  to	  re-­‐gain	  national	  sovereignty	  on	  these	  issues?	  (Why,	  why	  not?)	  -­‐ If	  yes:	  Did	  this	  awareness	  feed	  your	  work	  with	  the	  written	  observation?	  If	  so,	  how?	  If	  not,	  why?	  (Could	  you	  please	  elaborate?)	  -­‐ Some	   would	   argue	   that	   if	   the	   Court’s	   judgment	   goes	   against	   Member	   States’	  preferences,	   they	  might	  react	  by	  not	  complying	  with	  the	   judgment	  or	  by	  calling	   for	  legislative	  change	  at	  EU	  level	  to	  ‘take	  back	  power	  to	  the	  national	  level’.	  Has	  this	  ever	  been	  a	  concern	  of	  yours	  in	  your	  work	  with	  written	  observations	  to	  the	  Court?	  	  
Concluding	  questions	  5. Based	   on	   your	   experience,	   does	   the	   Commission	   consider	   the	   preferences	   of	   Member	  States	  when	  deciding	  on	  its	  position	  in	  a	  preliminary	  ruling?	  -­‐ If	  so,	  in	  what	  sense	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances?	  -­‐ Why/why	  not?	  6. One	   last	  question:	   In	  your	  opinion,	  should	   the	  Commission	  consider	   the	  preferences	  of	  Member	  States	  in	  its	  written	  observations	  to	  the	  Court?	  -­‐ If	  so,	  in	  what	  sense	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances?	  -­‐ Why/why	  not?	  	  These	  were	  all	  of	  my	  questions.	  Is	  there	  anything	  that	  you	  would	  like	  to	  add?	  
 54 
Appendix	  2:	  Article	  267	  TFEU	  
	  Article	  267	  	  (ex	  Article	  234	  TEC)	  	  	  The	  Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	  European	  Union	   shall	   have	   jurisdiction	   to	   give	   preliminary	   rulings	  concerning:	  	  (a)	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Treaties;	  	  (b)	   the	   validity	   and	   interpretation	  of	   acts	   of	   the	   institutions,	   bodies,	   offices	   or	   agencies	   of	   the	  Union;	  	  Where	  such	  a	  question	   is	   raised	  before	  any	  court	  or	   tribunal	  of	  a	  Member	  State,	   that	   court	  or	  tribunal	   may,	   if	   it	   considers	   that	   a	   decision	   on	   the	   question	   is	   necessary	   to	   enable	   it	   to	   give	  judgment,	  request	  the	  Court	  to	  give	  a	  ruling	  thereon.	  	  Where	  any	  such	  question	  is	  raised	  in	  a	  case	  pending	  before	  a	  court	  or	  tribunal	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  against	  whose	  decisions	   there	   is	  no	   judicial	   remedy	  under	  national	   law,	   that	   court	  or	   tribunal	  shall	  bring	  the	  matter	  before	  the	  Court.	  	  If	  such	  a	  question	  is	  raised	  in	  a	  case	  pending	  before	  a	  court	  or	  tribunal	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  with	  regard	   to	   a	   person	   in	   custody,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   shall	   act	   with	   the	  minimum	  of	  delay.	  
